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Executive Summary 
 
In 2013, following a grant agreement signed between UNISDR and the Indian Ocean Commission, a joint 
UNISDR/ISLANDS project was started entitled “Strengthening Capacities for Unified Climate Change Adaptation 
and Disaster Risk Reduction Through the Facilitation of Risk Transfer and Financing Mechanisms”. It was 
implemented within the “ISLANDS Programme for Financial Protection against Climatic and Natural Disasters”. It 
also forms a part of UNISDR’s global project for around 30 countries: “Building Capacities for Increased Public 
Investment in Integrated Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction: 2012-2015” financed by the 
European Union. 
Four island countries in the Indian Ocean as well as the Government of Zanzibar participated in the ISLANDS 
programme composed of three components: the establishment of reliable disaster loss database (Component 1), 
risk evaluation and probabilistic risk assessment profiles (Component 2) and incorporation of risk management 
into public investment planning (Component 3). Economic analysis and policy reviews were developed as a 
package. This report aims to summarize all activities implemented in the project with a focus on public 
investment planning (Component 3) while a technical report on Components 1 and 2 is also available1. 
As a first step (Component 1), data cards on disaster losses and events between 1980 and 2013 were registered 
in a national disaster loss database. Though over 150 cards were registered, the loss records due to natural 
hazards were only ten. Economic loss due to natural hazards is estimated at approximately USD 1.3 million 
(2012 constant price) and most of the loss was due to fire (USD 1.1 million). In the following probabilistic risk 
analysis (Component 2), Average Annual Loss (AAL) for seismic risk was estimated at USD 0.2 million, with 
Probable Maximum Loss (PML) of USD 1 million for a 100-year return period. 
The loss and risk information highlighted the need to reduce risk to natural hazards. However, it, in itself, did not 
suggest policy guidance. Based on loss and risk analysis, a thorough policy review and economic analysis were 
implemented (Component 3).  
CATSIM analysis developed by IIASA identified that Zanzibar has sufficient fiscal resources to cope with its 
earthquake risk, even in the case of catastrophic event (500+ year event). However, this is due to relatively low 
seismic risk in the country. The main hazards that Zanzibar is facing are droughts and floods and it is predicted 
that these will be aggravated by climate change.  For those hazards, Zanzibar should collect more loss data and 
develop probabilistic risk assessment. Based on the loss and risk information, CATSIM analysis should be 
applied to those more frequent risks. 
The probabilistic cost benefit analysis (CBA) was implemented to examine the cost efficiency of the surface water 
drainage component of the Zanzibar Urban Service Project to reduce flood risks. The process and results 
highlight key challenges regarding limited loss data available in Zanzibar, which seems to lead to an 
underestimation of probabilistic benefit associated with the drainage improvement project. In spite of the 
reduction in expected annual losses of over USD 100,000, the project was evaluated to be cost-inefficient. 
Notwithstanding the results, it is meaningful to emphasize the importance of loss and risk information and to 
explain how probabilistic CBA can support specific evidence-based decision making   
Based on these findings, current Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy and especially public finance including 
DRR investment and risk financing mechanisms were examined. In spite of much progress in HFA 
implementation, no definite and systematic DRR investment policy exists in Zanzibar. Several sectoral ministries 
make risk sensitive investment implicitly. Cost benefit analysis, although required for large-scale projects, does 
not take disasters risk into consideration. Critical infrastructure may not be sufficiently protected against disaster 
risk and especially in the long term as effects of climate change become more obvious. Contingency financing 
mechanisms are also under-developed. 
To explore the financial aspects of DRM policy, Zanzibar also estimated the current investment in disaster risk 
management by applying a DRM Marker method in an examination of national budgets, proposed for the OECD 
by the World Bank in partnership with UNISDR.   
                                                            
1 For component 1 and 2, please see UNISDR /IOC (2014). Component 1 and 2: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles 
and Zanzíbar. Building capacities for increased public investment in integrated climate change adaptation and disaster risk 
reduction: 2012-2015. European Commission - Directorate General for Development and Cooperation. Geneva, Switzerland. 
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About 3 % (Tsh 21 billion, USD 0.2 million) of the budget 2014/2015 was estimated to be dedicated to DRM: 80% 
of DRM investment was through “significant” category that is embedded in development projects and mainly 
dedicated for prevention/mitigation. This represents the level of DRR mainstreaming in Zanzibar. Compared to 
AAL, this was a positive balance, but Zanzibar identified that budgets need to be linked to specific hazards (in 
this case earthquake) to be more meaningful. Much of the investment in DRR is related to expected impacts of 
climate change. 
During several meetings with the Ministries of Finance in the IOC region, it was established that a scattered 
approach to DRM is inefficient and there is need for stronger collaboration between the DRM agency, Ministry of 
Finance and other key sectoral ministries. Continuous capacity building on risk terminology and concepts, loss 
and risk information management and economic analysis was recommended by Ministries of Finance in the 
region. 
The loss and risk information should be examined from the perspective of both DRM policy maker and financial 
planners. Given the importance of public investment in DRR, continuous refinement of loss and risk information 
should be promoted through regular dialogue with data users. In the process of economic analysis, Ministries of 
Finance understood and appreciated the importance of loss and risk information. On some cases, they identified 
several mistakes and inconsistencies in the records in disaster loss databases and the data were corrected. 
Such exchanges of information will improve overall quality of knowledge management to support DRM decision 
making.  
Government needs to develop investment and financing strategies to address both extensive (small scale but 
high frequency) and intensive (low frequency but high impact). Climate change will increase risks in terms of 
frequency, geography and intensity. Understanding risk structures and the expected economic impact in the 
country is the critical first step to determine the optimum policy mix for each risk layer. In developing investment 
and financing strategies to address disaster risk, DRR investment and risk financing should not be considered 
separately. Depending on risk layers, the most appropriate policy mix changes and DRR investment and risk 
financing are not mutually exclusive. For example, DRR investment often decreases insurance premiums.   
This packaged approach with a focus on financial planners in government will be standardized and replicated in 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions in the coming years and the knowledge is planned to be archived 
and presented globally in a working paper series of UNISDR on “Public Investment and Financing Strategy for 
DRR”. The report summarizing activities in IOC region will thereby contribute to increasing the global knowledge 
base. 
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Introduction: Conceptual Framework 2 
In 2012, the UNISDR started a project called “Building capacities for increased public investment in integrated 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction: 2012-2015” under the financial sponsorship of EC- 
Development and Cooperation (EC-DEVCO). The initiative supports approximately 30 countries in Asia, Pacific, 
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean to systematically account for disaster loss and to develop probabilistic 
estimations of future risk. It provides a baseline for an economic approach toward better public investment 
planning. 
In the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) region, this initiative has been separately planned and implemented in 
2013-2015 in the cooperation with ISLANDS, in accordance with the project design developed by UNISDR and 
implemented through the “ISLANDS Financial Protection Programme against Climatic and Natural Disaster 
Risks”. 
The initiative has three components:  
• Component 1: disaster loss 
• Component 2: probabilistic disaster risk assessment 
• Component 3: public investment planning 
 
Component 3 of this initiative considers disaster risks in economic analysis to support and facilitate risk-proof 
public investment decision-making. It especially aims to contribute to the progress of HFA priority areas 
monitored through core indicator 4.6 “procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk impacts of major 
development projects, especially infrastructure” and 3.3 “Research methods and tools for multi-risk assessments 
and cost benefit analysis are developed and strengthened”.  
UNISDR has been in charge of designing methodologies for Component 3 and in the process, considered how 
natural science can be linked to social science to contribute to better decision making in public investment 
planning. In the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) region, this project has been planned and implemented from 
2013 to 2015 in cooperation with ISLANDS, in accordance with the project design developed by UNISDR.  
This report summarizes all activities implemented for Zanzibar3. Chapter 1 introduces basic country structure as 
background. Chapters 2 and 3 outline loss and risk as the starting point of analysis. Chapter 4 briefly explains the 
DRR policies of the country. Chapter 5 outlines the current state of risk-sensitive public investment planning and 
risk financing policy as well as brief summary of three types of economic analysis implemented in the country.  
In Component 3, we introduced tools a) to monitor DRM budgets to analyse the current state of public investment 
(called the “risk sensitive budget review”), b) to measure the impact of disasters on public finance and on the 
economy at the macro scale (CATSIM analysis), and c) to measure the impact of DRR investment on society 
(probabilistic cost-benefit analysis).  
In Chapter 6, recommendations for policy makers are presented drawing from the analyses implemented. 
Annexes A, B and C provide theoretical and technical background and detailed case studies on each tool. 
In this introductory chapter, the background, especially why we need risk-sensitive public investment, is 
explained. Then, the overall streamlined process from loss data analysis through probabilistic risk assessment 
into economic analysis is explained. Lastly basic concepts of economic loss are defined to provide a common 
understanding of key terminology.  
  
                                                            
2 This chapter was drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR) 
3 A series of workshop/meeting implemented in IOC region are listed in Annex D. 
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A. Background: what are challenges? 
 
Why do we need to promote risk-sensitive public investment?  First of all, economic loss due to disasters 
has been increasing in spite of substantial progress in DRR policies promoted by Hyogo Framework of Action 
(HFA) (Figure 1 and Figure 2).  HFA priorities have been progressing in all areas mainly due to the effort of DRM 
agencies. Especially during the past decade, capacity in monitoring and risk assessment has been developed in 
many countries. 
Figure 1: Economic loss due to natural disasters, 1980-2013 
 
Source: EM-DAT  
Figure 2: HFA Progress 
Source: UNISDR 
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Disaster interrupts or slows down economic growth by damaging public and private infrastructures and negatively 
affecting people and economic activities. Figure 3 portrays the Pakistan GDP growth estimate calculated by 
JICA, clearly demonstrating that disasters will slow down economic growth and that DRR investment will mitigate 
the impact. 
Figure 3: Pakistan GDP estimate, 2005-2041 
 
Note: IDRR means DRR investment. 
Source: Author based on the figure provided by JICA 
 
Secondly, to reduce the impacts of disaster, governments need to invest in DRR. However, governments in most 
countries are suffering from tight budget constraints. Fiscal primary balance is expected to be negative in the 
coming years (Figure 4). The financial situations of low-income countries are especially tight. If we consider the 
debt and interest payment of many developing countries, the budgetary situation would be even tighter than the 
graph portrays. 
 
Figure 4: Primary balance (% of GDP), 2006-20174 
 
Source: Author based on IMF 
                                                            
4 The primary balance is the difference between a government's revenues and its non-interest expenditures; it is the most 
accurate reflection of government fiscal policy decisions. A country with a primary deficit, for example, spends more on roads, 
schools, defense, than it takes in from taxes and other revenues. Source: http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/histdb/.  
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Going deeper into the details of public finance, we can see the additional influence of budget constraints. Figure 
5 portrays how public investment has been under pressure due to constant or increasing financial need for 
government consumption. Public investment, especially in low and lower middle-income countries, is very 
volatile. On the other hand, in spite of these constraints, public investment is significant, recently representing 6 
to 10 % of GDP in developing countries. Governments must protect the hard-won fruits of these investments. 
Figure 5: Government consumption and investment (% of GDP), 1985-2011 
 
Source: Author based on the World Bank Development Indicators 
 
Why does disaster risk matter in public finance? Although “risk as opportunity” has become an attractive 
political motto, on the ground, disaster risk simply represents costs for financial planners (both public and private) 
and society. While we often focus on disaster loss and impacts, the overall cost of disaster risk is a summation of 
a) ex-ante DRR investment and risk financing mechanisms, b) post-event response, recovery and reconstruction 
cost and c) disaster loss and impacts. The cost of disaster risk management distracts financial resources from 
other priorities regardless of ex-ante or post event efforts. The impact of disaster risk on public finance should be 
considered based on the overview of these three categories of costs.  
Recently there is increasing attention on risk-sensitive private investment (GAR2013). However, disaster risk 
management mechanisms should be first considered as an issue of public finance because national 
governments assume primary responsibility to protect people and assets from disasters, and the risk preventive 
infrastructure represents public goods to remedy the problem due to market failure. 
In economics, public goods are characterized both as non-excludable and non-rivalrous in that individuals 
cannot be effectively excluded from use and use by one individual does not reduce availability to others. Classic 
examples of public goods include street lighting, police service, and fresh air and water. Paul A. Samuelson, in 
his seminal paper of 1954 entitled The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, defined a public good (what he called 
“collective consumption good") as follows: “[goods] which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's 
consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any other individual's consumption of that good.” 
Disaster risk reduction mechanisms are also public goods satisfying conditions of non-excludability and no-rivalry. 
Sea walls and early warning system protect many people and assets at once and do not exclude anyone. The 
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problem of public goods is that no one wants to pay for the service and the goods are likely to be under-produced 
(i.e. free-rider problem5). 
The argument of public goods is closely related to market failure in economic theory. Market failure is a situation 
in which the allocation of goods and services by free market is not efficient. Market failures are scenarios in 
which the individual pursuit of pure self-interest leads to results that are not efficient – that can be improved upon 
from the societal point of view6. The typical causes that lead to market failures include lack of information, 
externalities, or public goods. 
When private sector does not properly assess the disaster risk, it tends to over-invest. While it is important for all 
members of society to properly recognize disaster risk, risk assessment is often costly and beyond the capacity 
of small and medium enterprises. 
Furthermore, the impact of disasters can be felt beyond private sector investment and spill over to society (e.g. 
damaged factory interrupts traffic and prevents response activity or interrupts production causing income 
decrease of the employee). In this case, portions of disaster costs are transferred to others in society. This 
phenomenon is called negative externality in economics. When externality exists, private sector does not have 
incentives to decrease investment in hazard prone areas even if they properly understand the risk. Government 
needs to commit to disaster risk management mechanisms precisely to provide sufficient risk information to 
society and thereby remedy the lack of information and externality problem.    
Assuring sufficient disaster risk management mechanisms reduces exposed and/or vulnerable areas and 
facilitates private investment in such areas. In this sense, disaster risk management mechanisms constitute 
important infrastructure supporting economic development of society. That is also a reason why government 
needs to commit to integrating disaster risk in public investment planning. 
In spite of decentralization trends, the role of national government does not diminish. Disaster risk management 
infrastructure, such as sea walls, are often very costly and beyond the financial ability of local governments. 
Given the positive externality of such infrastructure, national governments are justified to financially commit in the 
investment. Catastrophes such as Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 (just before HFA adoption) and Great East 
Japan Earthquake in 2011 (whose experience will influence post-2015 Framework for DRR informally called 
HFA-2) refocused the role of national government on their capability to prepare for and respond to intensive 
disaster risk. In the context of developing countries, accumulated impacts of low-to-mid scale disasters damage 
local level capacity and need support from national governments. 
In case of catastrophe, horizontal risk transfer mechanisms such as insurance may often not be sufficient. DRR 
investment is, unlike risk transfer mechanism, considered inter-generational risk sharing. Following the definition 
of sustainable development by the Bruntland Committee, only development that addresses the existing risks 
without compromising the ability of future generations to address them should be promoted.  
In summary, public investment in disaster risk management is theoretically justified and commitment of national 
level government is critical in spite of decentralization trends.  
What are the gaps to be filled? It is important to focus on the lack of linkages between natural science and 
social science, especially in economics. Risk information produced by natural science is not well connected to 
cost information examined by social science.  Even when risk information exists, if it is not linked to cost 
information, it is difficult to promote DRR Investment (Figure 6). For example, Solomon Islands states “If policies 
based on risk information would lead to increased project costs, budget constraints may limit utilization of the risk 
information. Promoting cost benefit analysis is necessary in order to counteract this “7.  
  
                                                            
5 Typical examples of free rider problem include congestion in public roads and pollution of air and water. 
6 A socially desirable state is called Paleto Optimum in economic terms. 
7 HFA Report of Solomon Islands, 2009-2011 Reporting Cycle 
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Figure 6: Required linkages between risk information and cost information 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
Related to the lack of cost information is an opportunity cost issue. Ministries of Finance are not concerned only 
about disaster risk. They need to respond to other competing country priorities. In many countries DRR is not a 
high priority and policymakers tend to allocate limited financial resources to other urgent needs such as poverty 
reduction, education and public health. It is also difficult to explain why there is a sense of urgency surrounding 
DRR, a challenge that often leads to problems securing financial resources. A classic dilemma for policy makers 
is whether they can justify giving up investment in growth and in order to invest in DRR?  In other words, risk 
needs to be examined through a socio-economic lens in each country. 
In the DRM cycle, response, recovery and reconstruction also place pressure on the allocation of DRR budgets. 
Reconstruction and compensation for those affected is imminently needed in the majority of cases. In such 
situations, budget restructuring following a disaster often takes money away from DRR for use in reconstruction. 
To assure sufficient money for DRR investment, it is necessary to be able to justify the cost effectiveness of that 
DRR investment –as compared to expenditure in response and reconstruction. 
What exacerbates this difficult situation even more is that most countries do not have DRM labelling or dedicated 
budget lines for DRM in their public accounting system. So they don’t know how much they spend on DRR, 
response and reconstruction. Sectorial DRR is especially hard to label, as it is often embedded in larger projects. 
For example, earthquake proof school building is included under the larger category of school building so that the 
part of budget dedicated to strengthen the facility is not visible, making investment tracking almost impossible. 
Not having a DRM budget monitoring system results in the inefficient use of resources and an insufficiency of 
funds. Without knowing their current budget status, countries cannot properly evaluate the current level of DRM 
and estimate how much funding is required for further promoting DRM activities. Nepal claims “The budget 
allocated for disaster preparedness and mitigation is spread among different projects which render it ineffective. 
There is a need to develop and implement a financial tracking system to monitor all DRR related expenditures for 
mitigation, preparedness and emergency response”8.  
Considering all, the key questions that governments must tackle would be, "how much money should be 
allocated to DRM in total?” and “how to decide the most efficient and effective allocation of money between risk 
reduction and risk financing?” (Table 1).  Subsequently, more specific issues need to be examined: the design of 
risk sensitive investment mechanisms and risk financing mechanisms (i.e. appropriate combination of 
contingency funds, insurance and other tools). 
                                                            
8 HFA Report of Nepal, 20xx 
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Table 1: DRM structure 
Risk reduction Risk financing Disaster management 
Prevention  Mitigation Preparedne
ss 
Transfer Proactive 
retention 
Response Reconstruction 
e.g. 
land use 
planning 
e.g. 
housing 
retrofitting 
e.g. 
contingenc
y planning 
e.g. 
insurance 
e.g. 
contingenc
y fund 
Emergency 
management 
Build back 
better 
 
B. Streamlined process for evidence based decision making 
Given challenges identified in Section B, how to combine risk and cost information?  The initiative introduced a 
five-step process (Figure 7). The first step was to identify loss trends and produce risk profile (mainly activity of 
Components 1 and 2). Subsequently, the current state of DRR policy, public investment policy and budget was 
examined to verify the gap between risk and DRR efforts. Expected impact on public finance was examined with 
more detail using the CATSIM model. Lastly, to examine the degree a DRR policy could mitigate the negative 
impact of a hazard, probabilistic cost benefit analysis was conducted. It is of note that there should be a cost 
benefit analysis for all kinds of DRR policies and this initiative presented a methodology using only one example. 
These analyses, combined, are expected to provide insights on and facilitate evidence-based decision making for 
risk-sensitive public investment planning. 
Figure 7: Overall design to support evidence based decision making 
 
Source: Author 
Understanding loss and risk in a country is the first step to evidence-based decision making. Loss and risk data 
present what has historically been lost and what is likely to be lost in future. Both loss and risk information 
contribute to produce hybrid curves portraying all possible combinations of probability of an event happening and 
the expected loss (Figure 8) in all risk layers including intensive (low frequency and high loss) and extensive 
(high frequency and small loss) (See Chapters 2 and 3). However, as outlined above, this information alone 
cannot determine how much should be invested in DRR.  
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Figure 8: Hybrid loss exceedance curve 
  
Source: UNISDR 
Step 2 aims to determine the gap between risk and current levels of DRR policy. An examination of current DRR 
and investment policies and a comparison between risk levels and DRR investment will provide insights on how 
much investment in DRR is needed to fill the gap (Figure 9). (See Chapters 4, 5 and Annex A). 
Figure 9: Gap identification, drawn from budget and policy analysis 
Note: Impact of investment usually lasts for certain project periods and therefore reduces AAL the following year.  
Source: Author 
Step 3 measures the impact of disaster on economy and public finance, to further verify the expected impact of 
disasters on a country. The focus is not necessarily limited to direct loss and indirect loss, and macro-economic 
impacts are considered to a certain extent depending on the model. In the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) 
region, the CATSIM model developed by IIASA and taking indirect loss to a certain degree was used to measure 
the impact of disasters on public finance (See Chapters 5 and Annex B). 
Step 4 aims to measure the impact of policy on DRR. Some policies are more cost efficient than others, meaning 
that such policies reduce risk more with less investment. Cost benefit analysis is implemented in this step. (See 
Chapter 5 and Annex C). DRR policy can shift the risk curve inward (i.e. lower frequency of event happening 
and/or decrease of expected loss) (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: Shift of loss exceedance curve by DRR investment (blue) and new risk generation (red) 
Source: Author 
Climate change will also influence loss exceedance curve. However, investment in mitigation and adaptation can 
reduce the total cost. This is graphically expressed in Figure 11. Climate change will shift the curve upward while 
mitigation and CCA will work to shift the curve to original position. Climate change impact can be integrated into 
economic analysis of disaster risk applying the same methodological concept when disaster and climate change 
risk assessment are integrated. 
Figure 11: Climate change impact 
 
Source: Author 
These analyses, in combination, suggest that a risk-layered approach is crucial to manage disaster risk (Figure 
12). In the extensive risk layer (high probability and low expected loss), investment for risk reduction is basically 
the most cost-efficient. However, some measures for risk reduction (e.g. emergency drills as preparedness) can 
be cost-efficient (and efforts should be devoted to) all risk layers. However, in the intensive layer (low probability 
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and high expected loss), risk reduction is often an unaffordable and prohibitive option.  Regarding risk financing, 
contingency funds will be effective in middle risk layers. However, to prepare for intensive risk, risk transfer 
schemes, such as insurance, would be more cost-efficient. It is important to note that DRR efforts decrease the 
scope for risk financing mechanisms, bringing risk premiums down and making insurance more affordable.  DRR 
investment and risk financing mechanisms, therefore, should be considered in synergy to identify the optimum 
mix in public finance policy. 
Figure 12: Risk layered approach 
 
Source: Author 
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C. Basic concept of economic loss: direct loss, indirect loss and macro-
economic impact 
 
Disasters have diverse impacts on society; they are often categorized into economic, social and environmental 
impacts (Figure 13). Economic impacts include, for example, loss of assets and business interruptions. Social 
impacts include death, injury and changes to the functioning of communities, to name a few. Some impacts are 
both economic and social. For example, increased poverty and unemployment would be interpreted from both 
perspectives. Environmental impacts are for example, loss of habitats for animals and deforestation due to 
natural fire.  When these are all combined, disaster can have a macro-economic impact, for example, the 
reduction of GDP and trade balances. Economic analysis only focuses on the economic impacts of disaster. 
Figure 13: Impact of Disaster 
 
Source: Author 
 
It is important to clarify the difference between direct loss (physical loss centred), indirect loss and macro-
economic impact at the start of analysis (Figure 14, Table 2).  National disaster loss databases often focus only 
on direct loss.  Probabilistic risk assessment is also often limited to physical impacts of disasters. In these cases, 
economic analysis based on available loss and risk data will also be limited to direct loss only.  The initiative 
underway in this project is not an exception. Our focus in the cost benefit and CATSIM analyses is on direct 
physical loss and does not include indirect loss and macro-economic impact9. 
                                                            
9 CATSIM analysis includes indirect loss to certain extent because it considers “implicit liability” of government, which means 
compensation to the affected. For Madagascar, the impact of public finance on macro-economy was also estimated. 
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Figure 14: Direct loss, indirect loss and macro-economic impact 
 
Source: Author 
 
Table 2: Direct loss, indirect loss and macro-economic impact 
 Direct loss Indirect 
loss 
Macroeconomic 
impact 
Typical 
examples 
Loss of capital stock Loss of economic activities 
(e.g. Business interruption) 
after the event 
GDP 
Inflation 
trade balance 
Time frame Within  
the first few hours 
Up to multiple years Up to multiple years 
Concept stock flow flow 
Source: Author 
 
C.1. Direct loss 
Direct loss is nearly equivalent to physical damage. Examples include death and loss to physical assets such as 
damaged housings, factories and infrastructure.  Direct losses usually happen within the first few hours after the 
event and are often assessed immediately after the event to estimate recovery cost and claim insurance 
payment. These are tangible and can be relatively easily measured. However, there are still technical challenges, 
for example, how to assign monetary value to such damage. Or, should direct losses should be estimated as 
purchased value, book value10 or replacement cost1112?  
                                                            
10 Book value means the current value of the asset on accounting book taking depreciation into consideration. 
11 Replacement cost can be cheaper than the price at which the asset was purchased. For example IT machines usually have 
become much cheaper during this decade.  In this case, loss reported using purchased price means overestimation of the loss. 
12 Due to lack of data availability and urgent need to identify the recovery costs, replacement costs are often used in the world 
as a practical solution. 
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There is another important issue in measuring direct loss; “How to evaluate human loss?”  There are some 
methodologies, for example, that evaluate human loss as lost income. However, this remains an on-going debate 
among economists because assigning monetary value to human life is an ethical issue, considered morally 
wrong. If we use the lost income approach, the life of a rich person is more valuable than a poor person. But 
sometimes, monetary value is assigned to human loss. For example, after 911, NY City estimated the monetary 
value of human loss in the World Trade Center, Many were high income, young to middle-aged people who pay 
high taxes and consume and invest heavily in the NY economy. The economic planner of city government 
practically would have needed the economic and financial impact of loss of such people, but this is a very rare 
case. It is not common to monetize human loss13.  
In the case of earthquake impacts on building assets, if data on probabilistic distribution of earthquake hazards, 
building by structure and age, and the past disaster record are availabe, we can estimate the value of expected 
building damage.  If we multiply the number of houses destroyed by average cost of construction, then we can 
estimate monetary value of such building loss (Figure 1514). 
Figure 15: impact of earthquake on building 
 
Source: Author 
 
Regarding human loss due to earthquakes, if similar data such as probability, building structure and age, and 
past disaster records are available, then we can also estimate mortality. 
                                                            
13 This does not necessarily mean policy makers should not evaluate human loss at all. Most economists simply claim that 
human loss should not be evaluated at monetary value.  Human loss should be counted as number of person killed, injured etc.  
Cost-effectiveness approach is developed for economic evaluation to determine options, for example, to reduce mortality. In a 
similar way to cost-benefit analysis explained in Annex C, this approach compares several options and evaluates cost-
efficiency given certain objective such as x % reduction of mortality. 
14 The formula in the figure is often called “vulnerability function” in probabilistic risk assessment. 
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Figure 16: Mortality estimate process 
 
Source: Author 
 
It is clear from the examples that we need to have risk profiles, past loss data and baseline data, for example 
number of buildings by structure and age to estimate the loss.  
C.2. Indirect loss and macro-economic impact 
Indirect loss is more complicated. For example, a reduction in labour force and physical capital will cause 
business interruption and therefore a decrease in production. The reduction of production might be instantly 
recovered but most often it lasts several years. Damage to economic activity, therefore, should be monitored 
over a longer period.  Indirect losses are conventionally estimated within maximum of five years; it is reported 
that most loss occurs in the first two years after the disaster. Measurable impacts are often loss to production and 
income due to destruction of physical assets15. Though these indirect losses might be seemingly measurable, it is 
difficult to isolate the impact of disaster from others, for example, global financial crisis16.  Technically speaking, 
to estimate indirect loss, it is necessary to have a “production function” linking labour and capital with production.   
There are immeasurable indirect losses, which can be positive or negative, for example, human suffering 
(negative) or increased sense of mutual help (positive). Though they are not easily measurable, it is important to 
recognize such issues.  
Macro-economic impact is much more complicated, because economic activity is interlinked. For example, 
production decreases are likely to push prices upward, if demand level remains stable. The rise of price level will 
increase interest rates17. High interest rates will bring private investment demand down. Reconstruction activity 
through public spending might produce effective demand for depressed economy but might crowd out private 
investment in growing economy. To estimate macro-economic impact, it is important to model the causal 
relationship of all these factors. Macro-economic impacts such as GDP, inflation and trade balances will often 
                                                            
15 Decrease of production will impact the wage level and dividend level. 
16 Another difficult issue would be for example, that lost product has two prices, which are producer price and consumer price. 
When measuring production sector’s loss, then producer price would be more appropriate. On the other hand, if it is desirable 
to measure the loss from the interrupted service, consumer price would be better. 
17 The reason for this increase is because people want to withdraw money from the bank, and banks need to set high interest 
rates, as incentives to maintain deposit levels. 
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persist for several years and should also be monitored over time. They are conventionally estimated within 
maximum of five years after disaster events.  
Indirect loss and macro-economic impacts are highly analytical and the results change depending on many 
factors. First, the result depends on geographic scale, for example, municipality, region, or nation. For example, 
the impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake on the national economy is estimated to be negative (i.e. a loss in 
production). But if we look at the regional scale, while Miyagi prefecture including Sendai City-- severely affected 
by the tsunami-- had a negative impact, Tokyo had a positive impact --an increase in production to cover the loss 
in Miyagi prefecture.  
Second, the result depends on the time an impact is estimated. As time passes, more information is gathered but 
some information will also be lost. For example, the estimate of one month after the event usually cannot 
integrate the impact of reconstruction activity on macro economy. In the case of intensive disasters, even after 
one year, the impact of reconstruction activity cannot be fully evaluated. 
Third, the result also depends on the availability of baseline economic scenarios. The impact of a disaster on the 
macro economy should exclude other factors. For example, if the economy has been declining for the past 
decade and is likely to decline in coming five years, even if the GDP decreases after the disaster, that might be 
reflecting the general economic trend more than the event itself. 
Forth, the results depend on the definition of impact, which is likely to be politically influenced by main concern 
for society and its policy makers. In case of 911, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) estimates 
included the increase of security costs. After Niigata earthquake of Japan --which also caused nuclear power 
plant problems, though much smaller scale than Fukushima, Niigata prefecture included an estimate of the 
impact of “reputation loss” due to the nuclear problem. 
C.3. Macro-economic impact 
In analysing macro-economic impact, it is very important to analyse the impact from supply and demand sides 
and short and long-term perspective (Table 3). From supply side, decrease of production due to capital loss can 
be observed as a negative impact in the short term. However, in the long term, replaced new and more 
productive factories can improve efficiency and produce positive impact. From the demand side, decline of 
income, asset value, and population can be all observed as negative impacts in the short term. However, 
reconstruction demand can have a positive impact, especially for depressed economies that lack effective 
demand. The total impacts can be evaluated as the balance of supply and demand side impacts. A macro-
economic model is constructed based on many assumptions reflecting causal relationships that impact both the 
demand and supply sides. 
Table 3: Macro-economic impact 
  Short Term 
Impact 
Long Term 
Impact 
Supply 
Decline of production 
capacity due to capital 
loss 
Negative  
Technological progress 
(e.g. replacement of 
factory) 
 Positive 
Demand 
Decline of income Negative  
Decline of asset value Negative  
Population decrease Negative Negative 
Reconstruction demand Positive Positive 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 17: Example of economic modelling 
 
Source: Author 
 
When macro-economic modelling is not available or a more micro-level approach is more practical, a sectoral-
based approach might be preferable. The essence of estimating economic impact is in how disasters impact 
labour and capital --the two most important factors for economic growth (Figure 18). If capital and/or labour 
decrease, production will decrease based on the production function. Each sector, or even each company, has a 
different production function. Those results will constitute GDP estimates (Figure 19). Sectors often assessed are 
infrastructure, schools, hospitals, energy etc. However, when summarizing them, we need to be careful about 
double-counting and the inter-relationship between sectors. When each sector is not well coordinated, double-
counting often occurs.  Inter-relationships between sectors also should be checked using an input-output table, if 
possible. 
Figure 18: Production function 
 
  Source: Author 
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Figure 19: Production function by sector 
 
  Source: Author 
 
C.4. Impact on public finance 
When considering the impact of disasters on public finance, similarly we need to explore the demand and supply 
sides of public finance. On the demand side, increased need for expenditure in response, recovery and 
reconstruction are always observed. On the supply side, decrease of financial resources by reduced tax and fees 
can be also noted. Therefore, fiscal balances almost always worsen (Figure 20). 
Figure 20: Fiscal impact of disasters 
 
Source: Author 
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A worsened fiscal balance often has a negative impact on the macro economy. Figure 21 below presents three 
cases of a negative chain of fiscal impact: debt increase, expansion of monetary supply, tax increase. Whichever 
option a government takes, it will have a negative impact on macro-economy. IIASA’s CATSIM model estimates 
the impact of public finance on macro-economy. 
Figure 21: Relationship between fiscal impact and economic impact 
Source: Author 
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1. Country Structure18 
The Zanzibar islands (Unguja and Pemba) are located about 5 – 6 degrees south of the equator (Figure 22). The 
total land area of Zanzibar is 2,560 km2. Unguja is 1464 km2 and Pemba 985 km2. The islands are mainly low 
lying with highest points of 120 and 95 meters, respectively. 
Zanzibar enjoys a tropical climate with mild temperatures with an average annual high of 30.30 C and low of 23.50 
C. The islands have relatively high levels of precipitation with long rains in March to May, and shorter rains in 
November to December. The dry season lasts from June to October. However, there are differences across the 
two islands (Unguja and Pemba) in temperatures and average rainfall and considerable variability across years. 
El Niño and La Niña are important factors in the annual weather patterns.  
Figure 22: Islands of Zanzibar 
 
   
  
                                                            
18 This chapter was drafted by Gerard Hendriksen 
A. Zanzibar Islands and the coastline of 
Tanzania mainland 
B. Unquja and Pemba Islands 
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A. Population 
The Table 4 below provides some of the most important population data. Most of the data are based on the 
Population and Housing Census carried out in Aug 2012.  
Table 4: Zanzibar population information 
Description Data Source of data 
Total population   1,303,569 (2012) 
Population census 2012 
Population Density 
(people/km2)  530 (2012) 
Population growth   2.8%  (av 2002-12) 
Average household size 5.1 (2012) 
Urban population (% of total 
population) 47% (2012) 
Age dependency ratio 86% UNFPA; Youth in Zanzibar, Facts 
and figures, 2012 
Population below national 
poverty line) 44% (2009) Household Budget Survey 2009/10 
Literacy rare (% of population 
age 15+) 
Men 90.5% and women 81.4% 
(2010) 
Tanzania Demographic Household 
Survey (TDHS), table 3.3.1 page 
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Human Development Index 0.66 Zanzibar Human Development Report 2009. Data from 2002/03 
 
The Population Census of 2012 reports that 47% of the people live in urban areas. The Town District (Zanzibar 
Municipal Council, ZMC) which includes Stonetown, the heritage site and neighbouring areas, counts 223,000 
people (approximately 20% of total population) and is surrounded by the West District, with a population of 
370,000 (approximately 30% of total population), mostly bordering the ZMC and adding to the urban sprawl. 
Other urban centres are much smaller in size, a maximum 3 to 5,000 inhabitants (Nungwi is the biggest with 
10,000 people). These concentrations are therefore of a different scale than the ZMC area. 
B. Political Structures 
Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous state within the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) that was established in 1964 
combining Zanzibar and the former Tanganyika. The relationship between these two countries is determined 
through the national constitution or “Katiba” which is currently being reviewed. This process is attracting much 
political attention as it can very well bring significant changes in the current arrangements. 
Zanzibar has its own administration (the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar of RGZ) composed of 
the Revolutionary Council (Cabinet of Ministers) and the House of Representatives with 81 Members. A total of 
50 Members are elected by popular vote, 10 appointed by the President, five reserved for the Government 
appointed Regional Commissioners, 15 filled by women on a party basis in proportion to the elected seats and 
one seat reserved for the Attorney-General. Members serve five-year terms.  
Zanzibar is also represented in National Assembly of the URT. Security, foreign affairs, immigration, monetary 
issues (Central Bank), deep sea fishing and oil and gas are among the so-called union matters while all other 
affairs are directly governed by Zanzibar.    
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After the last general elections held in 2010, Zanzibar formed a coalition government between the most popular 
parties: the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF), which in the previous elections had 
often violently clashed. The current president of Zanzibar is Ali Mohamed Shein and there are two Vice 
Presidents, one of them being the leader of the CUF. There are 16 Ministries and a total of 28 Ministers and 
Deputy Ministers (Table 5).   
Table 5: List of ministries in Zanzibar 
 Ministry  
1 Office of the president includes the Planning Commission and the Regional Administration  
2 First Vice President Office (includes Department for Environment and Climate Change Unit) 
3 Second Vice President Office (includes Department for Disaster Management) 
4 Ministry of Finance  
5 Ministry for Public Services and Good Governance  
6 Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and Justice  
7 Ministry for Infrastructure and Communication 
8 Minister for Education and Professional Training 
9 Ministry for Health 
10 Ministry for Lands, Housing, Water and Energy 
11 Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources 
12 Ministry for Livestock and Fisheries 
13 Ministry for Social Welfare, Women and Children Development 
14 Ministry for Information, Culture, Tourism and Sports 
15 Ministry for Trade, Industries, and Marketing 
16 Ministry for Labour, Peoples Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives 
Source: http://zanzibar.go.tz/ 
The Zanzibar Planning Commission (ZPC) in the President's Office coordinates the country’s Sectorial 
Development and Poverty Reduction strategy (MKUZAII) which is in line with the international Millennium 
Development Goals and national ambitions.  
The Department for Disaster Management is administered under the Second Vice President’s Office while the 
Department of Environment and the new Climate Change Unit falls under the First Vice President’s Office.    
The local Government in Zanzibar is administered under the President’s Office. The country is divided into five 
regions (three in Unguja and two in Pemba) and these are further sub-divided into 10 districts and 331 Shehias.  
The Government appoints the Regional Commissioners. Another important institute of the local Government is 
the Zanzibar Municipal Council, which is responsible for the largest urban settlement in the islands. This includes 
Stone town, which is a UNESCO World Heritage Site and is a major tourist attraction. 
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C. Economic Structures 
Table 6 below provides an overview of the key economic data of the country over the period of the last five years 
(all figures in USD real terms). 
Table 6: Zanzibar key economic information 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GDP  (USD million) 670 675 766 854 893 
GDP/Capita (USD/cap) 555 557 614 655 667 
Gross capital formation 
(USD million) 128 128 146 165 145 
Current account balance 
(USD million) -7 6 -12 69 -34 
Source: Socio Economic Survey 2013. 
Zanzibar’s GDP is reported in the Socio Economic Survey (SES) to be Tsh 1.442 billion (USD 892 million) for 
2013. The most important sectors in the economy are services (which includes trade and tourism and the natural 
resources (ALFF: agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forestry). The shares of the national GDP in 2013 are 
represented in the graph below (Figure 23). 
Figure 23 GDP 2013 by sector 
 
Source: Social Economic Survey, adapted by author. 
The tourist sector has become an important driver in the economy. The sector has grown rapidly over the last 
ten years and the records show total arrivals of 181,000 tourists for 2013. The tourist business is concentrated on 
Unguja island where there are hundreds of hotels of different sizes and qualities mainly along the beaches on the 
east and north coasts. Pemba Island has very few tourist hotels and receives only a fraction of the number of 
guests.  The tourist sector in Zanzibar has so far been little affected by disasters due to natural hazards as there 
are no extreme events recorded over the past years. Longer term impacts of climate change, however, might be 
more important as weather patterns change and beaches and coral reefs become more affected and weather 
patterns less predictable.  
By far the largest share of the population still lives off Zanzibar’s natural resources through crop and livestock 
production, fisheries and forestry activities. Agriculture is basically smallholder farming with a diversified range 
of crops. Among the food crops, rice is by far the most important cereal and cassava, banana and sweet 
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potatoes are the most important other food crops. Natural products account for about 85% of the total export 
value of Zanzibar and are dominated by cloves and clove products which were about USD 50 million in 2013. 
The export of the second crop, seaweed, is reported to have been USD 2.5 million. This makes the national 
economy very susceptible to changes in crop production and world market prices of cloves.   
Fishing provides an income for the population along the coastline. Statistics show an increasing number of 
people engaged in this activity. For 2012, the fish catch was recorded at close to 30,000 tons and valued at Tsh 
112 billion (about USD 70 million). Fish catches per fisherman are reported to be declining, as the number of 
fisherman increases and fish are more difficult to catch. The Zanzibar fishing fleet exists out of small traditional 
boats and very few of them are engine powered. Deep-sea fishing is regulated under the Union Government and 
licenses are provided to fishing vessels coming from various corners of the world.  
The local industry accounts for 11% of the national GDP and focuses mainly on food and beverages (including 
bakeries). The islands do not have many large companies and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) produce 
most of the goods. 
D. Public Finance 
Budget process 
The Financial Year in Zanzibar runs from July to June as is the case in all countries in the East Africa 
Community. Each year, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) prepares guidelines for the budget for the following year 
and the medium term plan. Priorities are set according to the poverty reduction plan (MKUZAII) and maximum 
expenditures ceilings are provided for each ministry and budget entity (the 2014/14 budget shows 50 entities 
including Ministries, Commissions, Regions, security, police and fire services). The different Ministries and 
entities starting in February prepare budgets and the draft are submitted to Ministry of Finance by end of March. 
A review process takes place involving the MoF, the concerned ministry and members of the Budget Committee 
of the House of Representatives. The draft budget is provided in hard copy to the House of Representatives by 
end of May. The Minister of Finance presents the budget to the House in June where it is further debated and 
adjustments may be proposed and approved. In principal this process is completed before the end of June by the 
start of the new financial year on 1st July. However, there have been delays in the process. For the coming year 
2015/16, the Government wants to move from a line item approach towards a Program Based Budget (PBB) that 
has already been piloted in a few key ministries and will be applied to all other institutions. This is expected to 
result in a more effective allocation of government resources according to the national priorities and objectives.  
The MoF keeps track of the expenditures of the different line ministries using their Integrated Financial 
Management System (IFMS). Changes in the budget can be made during the financial year after approval by the 
Permanent Secretary of the concerned Ministries and institutes. After the closure of the financial year on 30 June 
of each year, the MoF prepares the overview of actual expenditures. The financial statements are verified by the 
Auditor General before an official and approved record is provided of the expenditures of the past financial year. 
This process can take four to six months. The review provides figures on total expenditures of a ministry or 
institution but not necessarily all the details of the budget lines.  
Government Revenues and Expenditures 
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the collection of revenues and operates through two agencies: the 
Tanzania Revenue authority (TRA) which covers the whole of the United Republic and collects all customs 
revenues plus other taxes such as PAYE19, company taxes and others. The Zanzibar Revenue Authority (ZRA) 
collects Value Added Tax, petroleum levies, airport services charges and excise duties, to name the most 
important ones.   
The Table 7 below provides the Government Domestic Revenues aggregated from TRA and ZRA and other key 
figures of the Ministry of Finance in Zanzibar. The figures have been collected from the Socio Economic Survey 
published in March 2014 that provides data series of the last financial plus the four earlier ones. The data appear 
to show large difference between Government revenues and expenditures. A possible explanation is that the 
amounts budgeted for foreign aid sources have not always been forthcoming as quickly as the figures suggested. 
                                                            
19 PAYE means Pay As You Earn system, a system of income tax withholding that requires employers to deduct income tax 
and remit the deducted amount to the proper government authority. 
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Table 7: Zanzibar key national financial data (US$ million) 
 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Government  domestic 
revenue 
104 102 128 143 165 
Government  
expenditure 
178 233 249 245 217 
Recurrent expenditure 61 82 189 180 171 
Gross Public Investment 
(capital expenditure) 
53 104 90 95 83 
Foreign aid 36 79 68 73 65 
Source: Socio Economic Survey March 2014 
The Bank of Tanzania (BoT) publishes annual reports which also include figures on the Government revenue 
collection, expenditures and donor funding. The BoT reports that in each of the previous five years, the 
Government total expenditures were well below the proposed annual budgets.  While the recurrent budget is 
usually only a few percentage points different, the capital expenditures are 40 to 60% below the planned figures. 
The reason given for this is due to unavailability of donor funding.   
E. Other socio-economic elements 
E.1. Youth education and employment  
The population of Zanzibar is very youthful in character with 43.8% under 15 and 35% between 15 and 35 years 
old. Age dependency ratio (the proportion of dependents (people younger than 15 or older than 64) to the 
working-age population (ages 15-64)) is 86%. School enrolment rates have risen from 50.9% in 1990 to 81.5% in 
2010, which is still behind the 95.4% recorded in the mainland and still some way from reaching the MDG 2 
target of universal primary education.  There have also been questions raised on quality of education as reported 
by the UNFPA report20. The same report also states that only 35% and 57% of young women and young men 
respectively are employed in 2012. Young women living in Zanzibar are almost twice as likely to be unemployed 
in comparison to the same cohort living in mainland Tanzania.  
The Government is aware of the challenges posed by the rapid growing population. The MKUZA II targets 
vulnerable groups including youth. The strategy prioritizes the creation and support of economic activities in 
productive and service sectors that involve youth. Strategies brought forward in MKUZA focusing on youth are, 
amongst others, enhancement of implementation of Zanzibar employment policy, job creation and 
entrepreneurship programs and technical and vocational education. 
E.2. Transport infrastructure and energy  
Zanzibar has a dense network of surfaced and unsurfaced roads served by public transport (called dala-dalas) 
and private vehicles. Most places within the islands are within one to two hours reach from the commercial 
centres of the islands. Unguja has an international airport with 56,000 air movements (many of them small 
aircraft serving national destinations) and 925,000 passengers were recorded in 2013. Ferries connect the 
islands with mainland Tanzania and are reported to have moved about 2.8 million passengers in 2013.  The 
Zanzibar harbour handles international container cargo as well as goods to and from the mainland transported by 
both traditional boats (dhows) and modern ships.   
Over 50% of the population is connected to the electricity network that is much higher than in the other countries 
in East Africa Community but well below the other small island states. Electricity for the islands is brought in from 
the mainland through submarine cables of 100 and 20 MW capacity for Unguja and Pemba respectively. Stand 
by diesel generators of 25 MW and 5 MW respectively are only used in case of emergencies because of the high 
operating costs. This makes Zanzibar very dependent on mainland Tanzania for its electricity resources that can 
be considered a strategic good. The EU supports Zanzibar with a program focusing on renewable energy and 
energy efficiencies. Feasibility studies are being implemented for wind and solar power but financial costs and 
grid stability issues will determine their potential. Zanzibar is likely to remain dependent on mainland resources to 
supply the backbone of the grid.  
                                                            
20 UNFPA; Youth in Zanzibar, Facts and Figures, 2012 
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Wood, charcoal and biomass residues are by far the most important sources of fuel for cooking, resulting in 
serious pressure on natural forests, coral rag and other tree resources. Large quantities of charcoal and firewood 
are also imported from mainland Tanzania using local boats. Most of this trade is informal and discouraged 
because of the perceived damages it causes to the natural forests in the mainland.  
E.3. Climate Change 
Climate Change is already affecting the islands. Data of the Meteorological Authority show that minimum 
temperatures are – on average – around two degrees higher than thirty years ago (Figure 24). Changes in 
average annual rainfall do not appear to have changed significantly since 1971. However, the records do show a 
large variation in rainfall (from below 1000 mm to over 2500 mm) making agricultural production unpredictable 
(Figure 25).    
The Climate Change Strategy also provides information on changes in sea water level and increasing wind 
speed. The latter is particularly important and seems to be contributing higher and stronger waves and increased 
beach erosion.  
Figure 24: Trends in temperature attributed to climate change 
 
(Mean monthly Minimum Temperature Trends Jan – Mar (°C)) 
Source: TMA, Climate Change strategy 
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Figure 25: Trends in precipitation 
 
Annual rainfall: Zanzibar Airport, (mm) 1971- 2011 
Source: TMA data, Climate Change Strategy  
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2. Disaster Loss21 
A. Overview 
Component 1 of this initiative was to build a disaster loss database that registers not only large scale disasters 
but also small-to-medium scale disasters. The small-to-medium scale disasters are rarely registered in the 
international disaster databases, because their effects are considered to be less relevant from a macroeconomic 
perspective. However, such disasters usually impact the livelihoods of poor people, perpetuating their level of 
poverty and human insecurity, and eroding government budgets. They exacerbate local level sustainability and 
pose serious problems for the development of a country as a whole. 
The analysis of disasters at all scales allows the identification of aggregated effects over time, regional areas and 
hazards targeted as high priority, and impacts on housing and livelihoods of local communities.  
Loss information contributes to comprehensive risk assessment by providing an estimate of the risk of high 
frequency but small-scale risk. It also gives information on non-modelled hazards. Furthermore, it can be utilized 
as an input to economic analysis, for example cost benefit and economic impact analysis22. 
The key concepts introduced in the loss data analysis are: 
Intensive disasters: high-severity, mid to low frequency disasters, mainly but not exclusively associated with 
high profile fast-onset hazards. UNISDR classifies disasters as intensive when at least 30 people are killed, 
and/or a minimum of 600 houses are destroyed. 
Extensive disasters: low severity, high frequency disasters, mainly but not exclusively associated with highly 
localized and often slower-onset hazards. All disasters with less than 30 people killed, and/or less than 600 
houses destroyed, are classified as “extensive”. There is no minimum number of deaths or damaged houses to 
be considered extensive23. 
During the project, data on large scale as well as small-to-medium scale disasters were collected for 1980 to 
2014. The data were registered by sub-national region, which allows more detailed examination of loss 
distribution in the country. The current loss database basically registers direct physical loss data only. Indirect 
and socio-economic loss data are not registered in principle. Even if registered, it needs to be analysed with 
caution due to ambiguity of definitions. The disaster data not directly associated with natural hazards (e.g. traffic 
accident, marine accident, epidemic, shark attack) were registered in the database but excluded for analysis in 
this report24. 
The disaster loss database takes into account the different disaster types and registers a series of indicators to 
classify loss such as:  
- Damaged houses; 
- Destroyed houses; 
- Basic human loss (mortality, injured, affected).  
The loss data were assigned monetary value by applying the methodology developed by UNISDR, which allows 
comparison across countries25. 
The Zanzibar Department of Disaster Management hosted Component 1. The Department has since the 
beginning of 2014 collected disaster related data from various sources and is hoping to go back to the 1960s 
using information from the National Archives in Zanzibar. 
                                                            
21 This chapter was drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR) with the support of Gerard Hendriksen. 
22 As an example of loss data use for cost benefit analysis, please see case study of Annex C. 
23 The most well-known international disaster loss database called EM-DAT registers disasters for a minimum of 10 deaths (see 
http://www.emdat.be/criteria-and-definition). 
24 Fire is included in the analysis, though. 
25 For methodology of assigning monetary value to loss, see http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2013/en/gar-
pdf/Annex_2.pdf 
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The data is open to public in the following site: 
http://www.desinventar.net/DesInventar/profiletab.jsp?countrycode=znz 
B. Disaster loss in Zanzibar26 
Ten data cards were analysed regarding natural hazards. All cards were categorized as extensive disasters. Out 
of ten extensive disasters, fire is ranked the first (7), followed by electric storm, rain and windstorm (one for 
each). Total mortality is one, due to electric storm. 
Economic loss (physical) totals USD 1.3 million at 2012 prices. Most of loss was due to fire (USD 1.1 million) 
(Table 8).  
Table 8: Summary of disaster loss in Zanzibar 
 Data 
cards Mortality 
Economic loss 
(physical) 
Extensive 
  Electric 
storm 
1 1 - 
  Fire 7 0 1,136,310 
  Rain 1 0 146,937 
  Windstorm 1 0 3,498 
  Total 10 1 1,286,745 
Source: Author based on Zanzibar National Loss Database  
Though past loss data is not sufficiently recorded, Zanzibar’s disaster events are mainly related to rainfall. Long 
periods of little or no rain will cause droughts and result in crop damage or even failures. On the other hand, too 
much rain can lead to local flooding and damage to infrastructure, housing and crops. Rainfall figures have been 
recorded between 1000 – 2500 mm per year since 1971 (Figure 24). Fortunately, direct deaths attributed to 
these disasters are limited.  
Floods cause regular disruption and some damage in the low-lying informal urban settlement areas in Zanzibar 
where people have moved in. Reports mention that annually 20,000 people are affected in those areas during the 
rainy season. Because of the gentle slopes, there are no strong flash floods and the physical damage to houses 
and infrastructure tends to be limited. In this sense, floods in Zanzibar are mostly extensive in nature. Although 
there are general reports on the impacts of flooding and water logging, the local authorities are reluctant to keep 
official records of damages in the informal settlement as this might give the impression that the Government 
might be willing to assist the affected people. However, the official line of the authorities is that people have 
moved to those low-lying areas despite the warnings not to do so. Therefore no compensation or support is 
provided in case of these local disasters. 
The biggest flooding event in the recent history of Zanzibar was the downpour in April 2005 that brought an 
incredible 400 mm of rain in less than two days and is recorded as the heaviest for 40 years. Reports suggest 
that an estimated 10,000 people were made homeless and about 800 houses were submerged. One person was 
reported to have been killed. There are also reports of damages to roads and a bridge while some boreholes for 
the water supply systems were disrupted27. The International Federation of the Red Cross provided some relief 
efforts that were valued at CHF 110,000 (about USD 114,000). 
                                                            
26 For detailed methodology, see UNISDR/IOC (2014)  and http://www.desinventar.net/methodology.html 
27 Economics of Climate Change Zanzibar, volume 1 (2012) 
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In the case of drought in Zanzibar, there is time to respond and provide relief as the population is easily 
accessible, in contrast to many of the typical drought disasters in remote places in some other countries in Africa.  
For example, Zanzibar experience the effects of the same drought that affected East Africa and the failure of the 
short rains from October to December 2005, resulted in wide spread crop failures in the harvest season. A rapid 
vulnerability assessment (RVA) was coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment in 
March 2006. The RVA estimated that the cultivated areas for the six main food crops (rice, cassava, maize, 
sorghum, millet, and cow peas) were nearly 40,000 acres, of which only 22,00 acres were planted and the rest 
left as farmers’ feared the poor rainfall condition. The report also found that in 54% of the planted areas crops 
failed or withered. The lack of fodder and water resulted in increased livestock susceptibility to diseases, and 
reduced productivity for instance milk was down by 50%. At the extreme, cattle deaths were reported particularly 
in the Southern District of Unguja. Some herders were forced to sell animals at alarmingly low prices. The RVA 
also mentions that supply of clean drinking water was disrupted in some areas resulting in people using unsafe 
sources and incidences of diarrhoea were reported. The report unfortunately does not provide an estimate of the 
total economic costs of the drought that must have affected the national economy28. 
The Zanzibar Disaster Policy (2011) also mentions an example of the situation in 2008, which resulted from the 
rise of global food and fuel prices and inadequate and erratic rainfall. According to WHO (2009), the levels of 
acute malnutrition following the food shortage and food insecurity across Zanzibar islands significantly elevated 
with 22.5% (300,000 people) requiring food mainly for children under the age of five as well as pregnant and 
lactating women who were malnourished. The population at risk for food insecurity was about 700,000. 
There are reports from seismic activity. The US Geological Survey has data records of 11 earthquakes within 
200 km circle radius cantered around Stone Town. One tremor of magnitude 5.2 was registered at 159 km from 
Stone Town. The nearest tremor of magnitude 5.0 occurred 18 km north of Stone Town on January 15, 200529. 
However, there are no reports of any damages. 
If we look long back in history, there are also records in Zanzibar of a hurricane that swept over the islands in 
1872 and destroyed two thirds of the clove and coconut trees. The hurricane particularly hit Unguja. Pemba 
which is slightly further to the north, escaped with little damage. 
Table 8 shows only a small portion of the registered data in national loss database. There are many other data 
cards on marine accidents. Ferry accidents have claimed hundreds of lives over the recent years30. However, 
these accidents are not included in the present analysis as they are not caused by natural hazards. Epidemics, 
another important hazard for Zanzibar is also excluded from the analysis here. Drought, which is important in 
many parts of Zanzibar, should be included in the database but data was missing.  
The most important direct loss, indirect loss and macro-economic impacts linked to natural hazards are 
summarized in Table 9. The examples mentioned here are local flooding, droughts and storm damage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
28 Rapid Vulnerability Assessment of the Effect of Prolonged Dry Spell on Agriculture, Livestock Production and Environment in 
Zanzibar during the Agricultural Season 2005/06. 
29 JICA fish market study (2012) 
30 Two large ferry accidents occurred in 2011/12. Ferry Islander accident caused 159 death and 1,370 missing and Ferry Skagit 
accident caused 81 deaths and 212 missing. 
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Table 9: Natural hazards and their anticipated losses and impacts 
Hazard Direct Loss / Impact Indirect Loss / Impact Macroeconomic impact 
Local 
flooding  
Flood damage to private houses 
and property in low lying urban 
areas due to intensive rainfall 
Water borne diseases such 
as cholera, malaria and 
others 
Limited as the scale of the 
disasters is usually limited to 
low lying urban areas 
How to 
measure or 
estimate 
these 
costs/values? 
Flood reports providing details on 
number of houses affected, 
duration of floods, costs of lost 
property. Insurance reports may 
support information 
Health records of the local 
clinics showing increased 
incidence of diseases 
 
Droughts Loss of crops and possibly 
livestock 
Malnutrition especially of the 
vulnerable members of the 
community 
Loss of national income/GDP. 
Imported food supplies will 
affect the trade balance.  
How to 
measure or 
estimate 
these 
costs/values? 
Crop assessments and livestock 
data collected by ministries of 
agriculture and livestock 
Regular food security and 
nutrition assessments by Min 
of Agriculture.  
Vulnerability assessment of 
severe incidence 
 
Reports by Ministries and Bank 
of Tanzania  
Severe 
storms Marine losses and deaths. 
Damages to infrastructure 
Loss of income for families 
affected. 
Reduced communication 
network 
Macro-economic impact 
depends on the scale of the 
events 
How to 
measure or 
estimate 
these 
costs/values? 
Reports of dead and missing 
persons. 
Reports of damage to bridges, 
roads and electricity lines etc. 
  
Source: Provided by Gerard Hendriksen 
The criteria used to distinguish extensive disasters (number of lives and houses lost), are not really applicable to 
Zanzibar (and the other small islands) as 30 lives and 600 houses are large numbers compared to the total 
population.  
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3. Disaster Risk31 
A. Overview 
Component 2 of this initiative aimed to build a database for probabilistic risk assessment. UNISDR facilitated the 
identification and consolidation of a national focal point for disaster risk information and enhanced the 
understanding of risk concepts and risk assessing methodologies through capacity building workshops 
Probabilistic risk assessment differs from a “deterministic” risk assessment in that it attributes a probability to 
hazardous events. Probability indicates the likelihood of the event to occur during a given year; it is estimated 
using frequency and is expressed in terms of “return period” or “loss exceedance rate”. Risk is expressed as a 
combination of the probability of the event occurring and the expected loss when such an event occurs. 
In probabilistic risk assessment, risk is composed of three factors: hazard, exposure and vulnerability (Figure 26).  
Hazard data are basically calculated from a set of stochastic scenarios and in this initiative the data were 
extracted from global datasets32. Exposure data measures the degree to which people and assets will be at risk 
when a hazard hits, and often consists of inventories of buildings, population and infrastructure. In this initiative, 
we used a combination of global exposure databases and data compiled by national experts (processed to 
construct a proxy). Vulnerability indicates the susceptibility of exposed population or assets to suffer damages 
and loss. This is important because hazard affects exposed element in different ways. For example, a certain 
wind speed affects a wooden house more heavily than a concrete building. In other words, vulnerability data 
shows the relationship between hazard intensity and the expected values of damage. In this initiative, 
vulnerability data were also taken from global data sets. 
Figure 26: Key concepts of probabilistic risk assessment 
 
Source: Author 
                                                            
31 This chapter was drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR). 
32 Hazard, exposure and vulnerability data used for the risk assessment in Zanzibar is outlined in INGENIAR (2014) and 
UNISDR/IOC (2014). 
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Based on probabilistic risk assessment, a loss exceedance curve for each hazard is produced (Figure 27). The 
curve shows the relationship between each value of the losses and the likelihood (probability) of having such loss 
during one year. 
Figure 27: Loss exceedance curve 
 
Source: Author 
This curve enables the calculation of important national risk metrics called Annual Average Loss (AAL) and 
Probable Maximum Loss (PML).  The AAL is basically the combination of all the potential losses that can occur 
every year due to a particular hazard, weighted according to their likelihood of occurrence. Simply said, the AAL 
is the loss that can be expected every year, regardless of whether it actually occurs or not. It gives insights into 
investment planning because the value shows how much risk should be reduced or transferred annually to 
prepare for all layers of risk. The PML is the loss associated to a specific, usually long return period. PML is a 
loss that is not frequent, therefore usually high, but still possible. PML is a useful reference value to draft a worst-
case scenario and prepare for intensive events.  
Probabilistic risk assessment can be utilized for diverse policy areas, from emergency management planning to 
land use planning and financial and investment planning. However, caution should be given to the limitation 
caused by scarce data that feed into probabilistic risk assessment, and simplified modelling of complex 
phenomena. 
In the IOC region, UNISDR supported building of probabilistic risk assessment for tropical cyclone (wind) and 
earthquake hazards. Tropical cyclone was selected because it was clear from the disaster loss data outlined in 
Chapter 2, that the region (especially Madagascar and Mauritius) has been hit by cyclone very often causing 
much loss. Earthquake was selected due to data availability given the short time frame of the initiative, even 
though it is not a major hazard for the region. 
UNISDR and the national team collaborated to produce hybrid loss exceedance curves that combine probabilistic 
risk curves based on data collected in Component 2 with empirical risk curves based on historic loss data 
registered in Component 1 (see Chapter 2). Probabilistic risk assessment tends to underestimate the extensive 
risk and historic loss data is used to remedy this problem. In Zanzibar, loss data was not sufficient to produce 
hybrid lox exceedance curve. 
The challenge is that the current historic loss databases have time series that are too short to produce high 
quality risk assessments. Achieving more detailed risk assessments requires continuity on capacity building 
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processes, improvement of data/information and commitment of institutions, technical personnel and decision 
makers. 
As described above, the probabilistic risk assessment implemented in this initiative is very often based on global 
data and does not have high resolution. Therefore it cannot be utilized for detailed cost benefit analysis, local 
planning and insurance premium calculation. The result is currently also limited to the assessment of physical 
assets due to data availability. However, the result can be very useful to raise awareness of disaster risk and 
initiate dialogues on incorporating DRM into the country’s public investment planning. 
In Zanzibar, the Office of Chief Government Statistics and Disaster Management Department participated in 
disaster risk assessment activities in Component 2. In Zanzibar the risk assessment is not yet being used for 
decision-making but this may be possible when more historic datasets become available and probabilistic models 
are developed that reflect the island’s conditions.  
B. Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Zanzibar33 
In Zanzibar, UNISDR and the national team only conducted seismic risk assessment because cyclone risk was 
judged to be negligible. 
Table 10 presents the AAL and PML in absolute and relative values to exposed assets, Gross Capital Formation 
(GCF) and GDP. The seismic risk in Zanzibar can be considered low. AAL is USD 0.2 million and constitutes 
0.14 % of gross fixed formation34. PML is 0.4 million for 50 years of return period and it increases when return 
periods get longer. Even though a loss of USD 34 million may seem high, it only occurs on average, every 1000 
years, and even then it represents only around 2.6% of the total exposed assets. However, despite the fact that 
the risk is low, they should not be considered negligible because an extreme event, even if only very localized, 
can generate high disruptions, damages and casualties. 
Table 10: AAL and PML for earthquakes 
  
 
 
USD million 
 
Exposed 
Assets 
(2014) 
 
 
 
GCF 
(2013) 
 
GDP 
(2013) 
1,3 7 144 893 
Absolute Relative 
Annual Average Loss (AAL) 0.2 0.15‰35 1.39‰ 0.22‰ 
Probable Maximum Loss (PML)   
Return Period (years) 50 0.4 0.03% 0.28% 0.04% 
100 1.0 0.08% 0.69% 0.11% 
250 4.0 0.30% 2.78% 0.45% 
500 12.5 0.95% 8.68% 1.40% 
1000 34.0 2.58% 23.61% 3.81% 
Sources: Exposed Assets, AAL, PML: INGENIAR (2014), UNISDR/IOC (2014), GCF and GDP: Zanzibar Socio Economic 
Survey 2013  
                                                            
33 For detailed data source and methodology, see INGENIAR (2014) and UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
34 The AAL should be better compared with Gross Fixed Capital Formation; however the data on GFCF was not available for 
Zanzibar.  
35 Mille is a mathematical term that means per thousand, as its name in French suggests. It is represented by the symbol ‰. 
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Figure 28 shows the loss exceedance curve while Figure 29 shows the PML curve. In addition, the loss 
exceedance curves for different PML given different periods, specifically 50, 100 and 200 years, are presented in 
Figure 30. These plots show the probability of exceeding a certain value of loss in a given time frame; for 
example, the probability of exceeding loss of USD 13 million (PML for a 500-year return period) in the next 50 
years is approximately 10%. 
Figure 28: Loss exceedance curve for earthquakes 
 
Source: INGENIAR (2014), UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
Figure 29: PML curve for earthquakes 
 
Source: INGENIAR (2014), UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Figure 30: Exceedance probability curves given different times 
 
Source: INGENIAR (2014), UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
The analysis of risk concentration is first carried out for the different districts, and then for the different sectors 
(for both the public and private sectors, and for the main components of infrastructure at national level). Figure 31 
and Figure 32 show the AAL (absolute and relative to the exposed value) by district. 
Mjini Magharibi is the District with the highest AAL, in both absolute and relative terms. It also has the higher 
exposed value and concentration of population. On the other hand, Kusini Unguja District shows a low exposed 
value, but high AAL in relative terms. This can be explained by looking at the vulnerability of the exposed assets. 
The construction quality of the buildings, in terms of seismic resistance, is probably lower in Micheweni than in 
other districts.  
AAL in Mjini Magharibi is 0.18‰ relative to the exposed value, which means that, in general terms, that the total 
value of Mjini Magharibi can be lost every 3,500 years. Although it may seem as a very long period of time, it is 
important to recognize that it corresponds to a mean estimate and a worse scenario can happen. Therefore it 
shouldn’t be neglected. 
Figure 31: AAL by district for earthquakes 
 
Source: INGENIAR (2014), UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Figure 32: AAL (absolute and relative) by district for earthquake 
 
 
 
Figure 33 summarizes the AAL (absolute and relative to the exposed assets) for each sector. Both in absolute 
and relative terms, the “Residential Low-Income Constructions” and the “Residential Middle-Income 
Constructions among the built environment assets database have the highest risk level in Zanzibar.  In terms of 
relative value, the private constructions present the highest values and the public education and public health 
have similar relative AALs to the private constructions even the absolute average annual loss is not as big as the 
residential sectors. Generally speaking, the high risk of these constructions can be clarified by the fact that the 
private constructions present the highest level of the exposed values in the country.  It is worth to highlighting that 
ports (wharfs) and hydroelectric infrastructure register important levels of absolute AAL by reaching USD 44 
million  and USD 131 million respectively. 
Absolute AAL Relative AAL 
Source: INGENIAR (2014), UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Figure 33: AAL by sector for earthquake 
 
Source: INGENIAR (2014), UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
Due to the limited data in disaster loss database outlined in Chapter 2, we could not produce a hybrid curve. 
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4. National DRM/DRR/CCA Framework36 
A. Institutional Structures 
A.1 Disaster Risk Management 
The Disaster Management Department (DMD) was established in 2006 based on the Disaster Management Act 
of 2003. According to the Act, the department is the overall institution responsible for: 1) coordination of disaster 
risk reduction issues, 2) development and implementation of policies, plans, laws and operational guidelines, 3) 
capacity building in disaster risk reduction, 4) preparing disaster risk profiles, vulnerability assessments and 
disaster risk reduction information and communication systems and 5) conducting public awareness on disaster 
risk reduction.  
The DMD is placed under the Second Vice President’s office and its mandate and activities are guided by: 
• Disaster Management Act, No.2 of 2003 (which is currently under review) 
• Disaster Management Policy August 2011 
• National Operational Guidelines for DMP, 2013 
• Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (2011) 
• Disaster Communication Strategy (2011). 
• Monitoring and Evaluation framework for disaster management in Zanzibar (2013) 
 
The DMD is headed by a director, appointed by the President of Zanzibar. The department has currently 22 staff 
working in five major sections/units: 
• Planning and Research 
• Finance and Administration 
• Operation 
• Communication and Information 
• Education and Community mobilization 
 
The department is also supposed to recruit disaster management officers at district level that will liaise to disaster 
risk reduction activities at district and shehia levels.  
The National Disaster Management Committee is headed by the Second Vice President (in future this will be the 
Chief Secretary) and includes all Principle Secretaries from the other ministries. In addition there are disaster 
management committees at district (10) and shehia (331).  
Other institutions that play an important role in early warning of impeding disasters include the Tanzania 
Meteorological Agency which has a branch in Zanzibar and is mainly responsible for weather related hazards 
(wind and rain but also possible seismic and tsunami activities). The Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health 
are responsible for early warning on food security and health related issues including epidemics.   
A.2 Climate change 
Over the last years, the issue of Climate Change and the possible impact on Zanzibar has become more 
prominent. The mandate for mainstreaming Climate Change into the Government plans, is with the First Vice 
President’s Office. A national action plan is underway in close collaboration with the Zanzibar Planning 
Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the key ministries affected by climate change issues. 
B. Legal Structures 
B.1 Disaster Risk Management 
Zanzibar has established itself as a nation at the forefront of disaster risk reduction within the public sector. To 
ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national priority, the government has introduced disaster risk management 
in various national frameworks such as the Zanzibar Vision 2020 and the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and 
                                                            
36 This chapter was drafted by Gerard Hendriksen. 
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Reduction of Poverty. To implement this, the Government has introduced the Disaster Management Act in 2003 
and established the Disaster Management Department in 2006.  
Based on the Act, the DMD has introduced various frameworks, including the introduction of Disaster 
Management Committees at National, District and Shehia levels; introduction of a sub-national Platform and 
establishment of focal persons at all sectors relevant for disaster management. Sectorial policies and plans 
reflect disaster issues. Participation of private sector and the communities is also considered.  
Zanzibar’s Disaster Management Policy of 2011 refers to the importance of the national, regional and 
international fora on Disaster Risk Reduction that are conducted periodically. It also states that Zanzibar is 
participating in these fora inconsistently which results in a lack of opportunities of sharing experience with other 
countries in the region and internationally. The Policy mentions that the Disaster Management Committee will be 
the principal functional body for disaster risk management in Zanzibar and responsible for overall coordination for 
Disaster Management Policy, programmes, plans and strategies at all levels. It will also coordinate and 
collaborate with national, regional and international disaster risk reduction bodies. This includes the United 
Nations Agencies and other Regional and International Agencies because they provide human resources, 
equipment, financial and technical support.  The Emergency Preparedness and Response plan mentions that 
when the required response is beyond the capacity of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, a request for 
damage assessment may be made to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) or to regional or 
international organizations.  
The DMD has put various frameworks and guidelines to encourage other disaster risk management stakeholders 
to fully participate in its implementation. These include Disaster Management Policy of 2011, The Zanzibar 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan 2011, The Zanzibar Disaster Communication Strategy (ZDCS) 
2011, National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management Policy 2013, Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework for Zanzibar Disaster Management Policy 2013, and Districts Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Plan (for Mjini, Magharibi, Kaskazini A, Wete and Micheweni Districts). Currently, the DMD is in the 
process of reviewing the disaster management Act of 2003.  
The Department has created networking with all important sector ministries and institutions. These include 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Infrastructure and Communication, Tanzania Meteorology 
Agency (TMA), Tanzania People’s Defense Force (TPDF), Police Force, Special Departments, Local 
Governments etc. 
At local level, the Shehia Disaster Management Committees have been introduced at almost all Shehias with full 
participation of all groups of society (women, youth, elders, people with disabilities, representatives from Red 
Cross if available in Shehia or from other NGOs). The reporting system of disaster issues from Shehia to 
National level has also been introduced.  
B.2 Climate change 
Zanzibar is subject to the international agreements on climate change under the umbrella of the URT. The URT 
ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol in 1996 
and 2002 respectively.  The Vice President’s Office – Division of Environment on Mainland Tanzania is the entity 
responsible for the Clean Development Mechanism and climate change-related activities. It is the National 
Climate Change Focal Point for the whole of the URT, fulfils the function of the Designated National Authority and 
has the responsibility for international negotiations, preparation of national communications and in the future for 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) and National Adaptation Plans (NAP) activities.   
The URT produced a first national communication in 2003 and a National Adaptation Programme of Action 
(NAPA) in 2007. One of the priority projects identified in the NAPA was the Shifting of Shallow Water Wells 
Affected by Inundation on the Coastal Regions of Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar.   
The mainland government of Tanzania adopted a National Climate Change Strategy in early 2013 but that does 
not specifically cover Zanzibar. The Strategy proposes the establishment of a National Climate Change Fund 
(NCF) to finance its implementation. It is expected that this fund would become the channel for official flow of 
finance from UNFCCC international mechanism and development partners. It is not clear how Zanzibar will be 
included in the structure and would benefit from the NCF, if it is established and becomes operational (which is 
not guaranteed at this point in time as Government and development partners are still discussing different 
options).  
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The Economics of Climate Change study for Zanzibar was carried out in 2011 and provided data on the changes 
in the climate (the lack of long data series makes this challenging) and the impacts of major weather events on 
the national economy. The study also provided detailed information on the energy situation and opportunities for 
low carbon development. This was followed up by the formulation of the Zanzibar Climate Change Strategy that 
was approved by the Government in early 2014.   
The objectives of the Zanzibar Climate Change strategy are:  
1. To provide Zanzibar a coherent and consistent view on the vulnerability and risks from current climate 
variability and future climate change on the islands, 
2. To establish a response framework to address these risks, and to enhance low carbon sustainable 
development opportunities.   
3. To help build capacity and knowledge, raise awareness, and promote climate aware and sustainable 
livelihoods practices  
4. To guide the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation (and low carbon sustainable development) 
across government and wider society 
5. To propose ways to develop and strengthen the institutional and coordination arrangements  
6. To encourage the transfer, adoption and diffusion of technologies for increasing resilience and 
promoting low carbon sustainable development. 
 
There is a debate on-going as to the most appropriate financing mechanism for Zanzibar to ensure funds from 
national and international resources will be used effectively and efficiently. This might include the establishment 
of a separate Climate Fund as has been already done on a number of other countries. 
C. Status of Hyogo Framework for Action 
The national (URT) progress report (2011-2013) on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 
(2011-2013)37 was prepared by national focal point in the Prime Minister’s Office in Dar es Salaam. In several 
instances, the report refers to the activities and progress in Zanzibar through the DMD in the Second Vice 
President’s Office.  Table 11 provides an overview of the activities undertaken and progress made in Zanzibar 
against the 5 priorities under the Hyogo Framework for Action.  
Table 11: Progress of Zanzibar against the Hyogo Framework for Action 
Explanation of Progress to Date in Zanzibar 
Priority 1: 
Ensure that disaster risk 
reduction is a national 
and a local priority with a 
strong institutional basis 
for implementation 
The progress under the Disaster Management Act and DMD is explained in the main text. 
Priority 2: 
Identify, assess and 
monitor disaster risk and 
enhance early warning 
According to the Disaster Management Act, the Disaster Management Department has 
overall responsibility for coordinating disaster issues in Zanzibar.  
 
Important issues for early warning are done by other sectoral ministries and institutions.  
For this matter the department has closely worked with all institutions responsible for early 
warnings like TMA, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Livestock. 
 
In the events of disasters, the DMD through the structured framework of disaster response 
                                                            
37 Tanzania (URT) National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2011-
2013). Update: 18 November 2012 
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in Zanzibar has the role of collecting, analysing and issuing early warnings.  
 
The new proposed legislation will establish the centralized centre for early warnings 
particularly for natural hazards.   
Priority 3:  
Use knowledge, 
innovation and education 
to build a culture of safety 
and resilience at all levels 
The DMD tries to work with all groups/ levels with the aim of building the culture of safety 
and resilience. While preparing disaster management frameworks, the department has 
been presenting the draft document to the Members of Zanzibar House of Representatives, 
the Cabinet, the Inter-Ministerial technical committee, Ministerial technical committee (the 
Second Vice President’s Office), and the sub-national Platform. This is not only focusing in 
obtaining their contributions, but also is one among the way to build capacity of those 
officials. 
 
At another level, the DMD has been conducting meetings and workshops on DRR to 
teachers and students at all levels (from primary schools to higher learning institutions). 
The DMD has also running the essay competitions to primary and secondary students in 
Unguja and Pemba.  
 
Knowledge on DRR has been provided to the shehia disaster management committees 
and other public and community organizations.  
 
The department has prepared and aired TV and Radio programs to increase awareness.  
  
Priority 4:  
Reduce the underlying 
risk factors 
Amending the Disaster Management Act of 2003, is not only for the aim of making 
appropriate framework for DRR in Zanzibar, but also for promoting reduction of underlying 
risk factors. The existing Act and the new proposed legislation have mentioned the 
offences and penalties part.  
 
All the trainings and other awareness programs conducted has resulted into positive 
impacts on awareness building and are reducing underlying risk factors. 
 
Priority 5: 
Strengthen disaster 
preparedness for effective 
response at all levels. 
Several efforts have been taken by the Government and the DMD under the Second Vice 
President’s Office in collaboration with UNICEF and UNDP to enable the country (at all 
levels) to prepare and respond to disasters. Such efforts include establishment of DM 
committees at all levels, DRR frameworks, Disaster preparedness warehouses at Unguja 
and Pemba, DRR trainings etc. 
 
Since the marine accidents occur frequently in Zanzibar, the Office has also managed to 
create a strong network with local institutions to strengthen marine rescuing.  
Source: Zanzibar Disaster Management Department 
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5. DRR/DRM/CCA in Public Investment Planning38 
This chapter provides an overview of the current status of public investment planning related to disaster risk 
reduction/management and climate change adaptation in Zanzibar. It moreover contains a summary of the 
findings of the three types of analyses conducted under the initiative; namely the Risk Sensitive Budget Review 
(RSBR), CATSIM analysis and the Cost Benefit Analysis. Main stakeholders are identified after such analysis 
description. 
A. Current Status of DRR/DRM/CCA in Public Investment Planning  
Disaster risk management and particularly risk financing are not yet integrated in Zanzibar investment policies 
and there are as yet no clear laws and guidelines in this area. Cost benefit analysis is carried out for major 
investment projects especially those supported by the development banks and partners. The Zanzibar Planning 
Commission has a program to build more internal capacity as well to guide the decision-making process for 
internally funded projects.  
Environmental Impact Assessments are being enforced for all investments either in the public and the private 
sector and the guidelines have been drafted to screen projects in climate risks and this is being mainstreamed in 
the line ministries. This initiative is led by the First Vice President’s Office with support from UNDAP and involves 
among others the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission.  
Critical infrastructure such as ports, roads / bridges, electricity network and airports do not have a special 
protection plans but long term impacts of climate change are being considered in the case of long term 
investments. However, this is work in progress and more capacity building is needed. The national disaster 
management and preparedness efforts are led by the Second Vice President’s Office.  
The Disaster Management Policy (2011) and the draft Disaster Management Act of 2012 propose the 
establishment of a Zanzibar Disaster Management Fund (ZDMF) to ensure the accessibility of enough resources 
for disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery.  The sources of the ZDMF shall consist of:  
• any monies voted to it by the House of Representatives for that purpose 
• any monies made by way of donations or grants made within and outside Zanzibar 
• subscriptions by the public 
• any monies as a result of fines imposed as penalties under this Act 
 
It is not yet clear if the ZDMF will actually be approved by the Zanzibar House of Representatives and if so, when 
it will be put in place.  
The Government of Zanzibar is committed to investments in disaster preparedness and mitigation as is, for 
instance, reflected in the implementation plan for the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction 
(MKUZA II) for 2012 to 2016.  The issue is mentioned in a few places: 
• Cluster I: through the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) contributing 
towards Disaster Management and CC Mitigation by improving adoptive capacity against disasters. The 
project is implemented through the Ministry of Agriculture and the total amount allocated in the 
implementation plan is Tsh 12.2 billion (USD 7,6 million) for four years. 
 
• Cluster III: Preparedness and response to disasters guaranteed by 2015. The objective is to strengthen 
disaster management capacity in Zanzibar. MKUZA lists five projects covering DMD, fire services, early 
warning systems, and enhancing disaster management knowledge in the communities. Total budget 
allocated is Tsh 23.7 billion (USD 14.8 million) for 2012 – 2016 and mostly implemented through the 
SVPO.  
 
The sums above amount to approximately Tsh 35 billion (USD 21.8 million) or 1.4% of the overall budget (Tsh 
2,591 billion) for the MKUZA II implementation plan. It is expected that this will be funded from Government 
sources and from donors but the MKUZA does not provide detailed figures for this.  
                                                            
38 This chapter was drafted by Gerard Hendriksen. 
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Most other institutions do not allocate funds for disaster related activities in their annual budget resulting in 
inadequate preparedness and mitigation measures for most of the hazards, hence putting the country at high 
risk. 
There are no separate codes or dedicated categories for disaster preparedness and response within the budgets 
of the line ministries that could be used for tracking of disaster risk funds. Also it is difficult to track expenditures 
for disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response as these are often incorporated within the activities of the 
police and defence forces and in other ministries. 
B. Contingency Finance Mechanisms  
Governments take not only the legal and explicit liability but also the implicit liability where they are expected to 
intervene promptly to provide relief and recovery to the affected population (damaged and destroyed housing, 
loss of property). Zanzibar has had the fortune to be spared from large disasters from natural causes such as 
earthquakes, cyclones or flash floods. That is one of the reasons that disaster recovery mechanisms are less well 
developed than in some of the other islands. However, the Government of Zanzibar is aware of the lack of proper 
risk financing mechanism and is taken measures to strengthen its position in case of unexpected expenses due 
to natural or human induced disasters. There are a few finance mechanisms for managing disasters, summarized 
in Table 12. These mechanisms mainly address recovery and reconstruction costs. Thereafter, follows a 
discussion of the main measures listed. 
Table 12: Finance mechanisms for disaster management 
EX-ANTE MECHANISMS 
Contingency budget line  
Government funds under Unallocated (Vote UN, Tsh 8.5 billion (US 
5.3 million) 2014/15)  
Contingency funds  
Consolidated Fund (Vote 45, Tsh 70 billion (USD 43.8 million) 
2014/15) 
Insurance 
Limited use of insurance, in particular not for the low costs buildings 
that are most easily affected by natural events. No information if 
infrastructure is insured. 
Others -  
EX-POST MECHANISMS 
Diverting funds from  
other budget items 
Government has used this mechanism in some cases for instance to 
support the costs caused by the ferry disasters  
Imposing or raising taxes There are no records of such measures immediately after any event. However, this might happen on longer term.  
Taking a credit from the 
Central Bank (either prints 
money or depletes foreign 
currency reserves)  
Government of Zanzibar may borrow from Bank of Tanzania that 
serves both mainland and the islands. 
Borrowing by issuing 
domestic bonds 
Government of Zanzibar can issue Government Bonds as well as 
borrow from the Social Security fund 
Accessing international 
assistance 
Development partners and aid agencies (e.g. IFRC in 2005 floods) 
Borrowing from multilateral 
institutions 
Borrowing from multilateral institutions is possible in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Finance in mainland Tanzania. 
 
IMF has borrowing limits  
Issuing bonds on the 
international market 
Government of Zanzibar does not access the international market 
directly for bonds but could do in collaboration with the URT. 
However, issuing of international bonds is new in the region.  
Source: Author 
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The Disaster Management Policy of 2011 states that there are no national financing mechanisms established 
specifically for the disaster risk management activities. Past experience shows that the Government mainly 
responds to disasters after these have occurred and the emphasis has been on relief support rather than disaster 
risk management per se.  
In case of emergencies, NGOs and other origination provide assistance as well that is off budget. For instance 
after the severe floods of April 2005 the International Federation of the Red Cross reported to have supported the 
population with relief goods worth CHF 110,000 (USD 110,000) (source: Tanzania Red Cross Society- DREF 
bulletin 16 March 2007).   
The Government has disbursed emergency funding from the Consolidated Fund Services, or budget vote 45 that 
is about 10% of the national budget in 2014/15 and usually covers interest payment, securities and bond 
repayments as well as miscellaneous payments.  
In case of large emergencies as for instance happened after the two large ferry disasters that occurred in 2011 
and 2012, the Government has resorted to reducing the budgets of line ministries in order to cover for the 
immediate costs of the disasters. It is reported that after the MV Skygate ferry disaster, the Government spent 
about Tsh 571m or USD 350,000 (equivalent to about 0.1% of the annual budget) mainly for supporting rescue 
efforts and providing compensation.  
The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) 39 is another structure that can be used in case of severe longer-term 
stresses such as caused by droughts for instance. TASAF implements programs and projects that target the poor 
through cash transfers as well as labour intensive public works such as rural roads construction, reforestation 
and public buildings. Communities are directly engaged in the selection of programs and beneficiaries. In 
Zanzibar, TASAF is managed under the Second Vice Presidents’ Office. 
The insurance market is still relatively underdeveloped. There are a number of private and public owned 
insurance companies operating on the market in Zanzibar and some of these are connected to companies in the 
region. The Government established the Zanzibar insurance Company (ZIC) in 1969. The corporation is a 
parastatal organization owned by the Government of Zanzibar through the Ministry of Finance. The ZIC provides 
insurance products for motor vehicles, fire damages and burglary. Other regional companies offer medical 
packages. However, there are no products as yet that cover damages due to large disasters. 
C. Economic analysis to support risk sensitive pubic investment planning 
Based on the philosophy explained in the introduction chapter, three types of economic analysis were conducted. 
A summary of analysis follows for the Risk-Sensitive Budget Review, the Macro/CATSIM assessment and the 
Micro/Cost Benefit Analysis. Each of the theoretical and technical elements is also described in greater detail in 
corresponding Annexes A, B and C. 
C.1. Summary of the Risk-Sensitive Budget Review  
(See also Annex A for theoretical and technical backgrounds and a detailed case study) 
Overview: The Risk-Sensitive Budget Review (RSBR) aims to apply the DRM Marker method to identify the 
degree to which government has budgeted or/and invested in DRR/DRM/CCA. To that effect, the budgets of key 
Ministries and Departments have been analysed to mark those projects whose “significant” (but not main) 
objective is DRR and those projects specifically addressing DRR, which would not have been undertaken without 
the “principal” DRM objective.  
In addition to categorizing the budget/expenditure for different projects, functions and administration activities as 
Significant or Principal, they were classified into four distinct categories of disaster risk management, namely, 
Risk Prevention/mitigation, Preparedness, Response/Relief and Reconstruction. 
Scope: Table 13 below summarizes the scope of the budget review. 
 
 
                                                            
39 www.tasaf.org 
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Table 13: Scope of the risk sensitive budget review 
Year The budget 2014/15 
Coverage Government budget for FY 2014/15. Focus was on 11 ministries and 
institutions which are most involved in DRM and CC.  
Budget or 
expenditure 
Budget  
Current or Capital Both current and capital budgets 
Targeted hazards Fires, droughts, human and animal epidemics and long term effects of climate 
change 
    
Results: The overall estimated investment in DRM/CCA identified in this review is in total about Tsh 21 billion 
(USD 0.2 million), which is approximately 3% of the total Zanzibar budget of Tsh 708 billion (about USD 440 
million). Most of the budget is identified under the category “significant” as shown in Table 14 below.  
The budget review also tried to divide the marked budget in categories according to allocation within the DRM 
process. By far the most important category is for disaster prevention and mitigation as shown in the table below. 
No interventions were classified as reconstruction as Zanzibar has been spared of any major disasters due to 
natural hazards over the last years.  
Table 14: DRM/CCA investments across 4 components 2014/2015 budget 
Budget allocations per Risk Management 
phase/category 
Significant 
(Tsh billion) 
Principal 
(Tsh 
billion) 
Total 
(Tsh billion) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Marked 
Prevention/mitigation (1) 17.0  17.0 80% 
Preparedness  (2)   1.0 1.0 5% 
Response (3)  3.1 3.1 15% 
Reconstruction (4)   0.0 0% 
Total budget allocations    21.2 100% 
Share of total budget (% of Tsh 708 
billion) 
2.4% 0.6% 3.0% -  
Source: Author based on Budget 2014/15 
The expenditures can also be divided between DRM and CCA investments and this analysis shows that 43% of 
the identified expenditures are DRM related and these are in particular for activities implemented through the 
Ministry of Health. The balance of 57% has been classified as CCA measures for instance for agricultural 
research and for irrigation development.  
Component 2 of the project determined an average annual loss (AAL) of USD 0.2 million to earthquakes in 
Zanzibar.  A simple comparison of estimated AAL to the most current annual investment in DRR indicates a 
equal balance (Table 15). However, it is important to keep in mind that AAL is only estimated for earthquake risk 
and to go back to the actual marked activities to determine if they are linked to earthquake risk. If this 2014/15 
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investment could be reasonably linked to earthquake risk reduction, it would seem to offset the AAL by many 
years40. 
Table 15: DRR budget, loss and risk 
 DRR budget, 
2013/14 
AAL 
(Earthquake 
only) 
Loss, 1980-2014 
(10 data cards) 
Value 
 
USD 0.2 million USD 0.2 million 
USD 1.3 million,  
(Annual average: 
USD 0.04 million) 
Status 
 
NO GAP NO GAP 
Source: Author  
As reference, loss data were also compared to the budget. This comparison shows a positive balance. However, 
given that only 10 cards are registered for disaster loss database, the database may be incomplete; this also 
merits caution.  
Although this is only a very simple and straightforward example that cannot be extrapolated to other hazards or 
years, it serves to underscore the utility of both the AAL/past loss data and the budget review as a combined tool 
to move Zanzibar towards risk-sensitive public investment in light of their most important natural hazards. 
There were challenges in concluding the budget review. Planning and technical staff in sectorial ministries is only 
partly aware of DRM and what it could mean for their institutions. Disasters are largely seen as human related 
due to severity of the recent marine accidents. Disasters are considered to be the prime responsibility of the 
Department for Disaster Management in the Second Vice President’s Office and the relief services, fire brigade, 
police and defence forces. On the other hand, staffs in the ministries of health and livestock classify some of their 
programs as prevention and disaster preparedness (epidemic related) and such programmes were readily 
included in this budget review.  
While the DMD is well established with dedicated staff and budget, this is less obvious for climate change which 
is situated under the First Vice President’s Office and has very limited resources in terms of manpower and 
funding. The Government has programs to mainstream Climate Change in all ministries but that is still in its early 
stages.  However, ministerial staff is more aware of climate change issues and the possible long-term impacts. 
Changing weather patterns, sea level rise, increased beach erosion and salt-water intrusion are often mentioned 
in this context.  
The RSBR scoped for interventions that can be categorized as disaster risk reduction such as water 
management, irrigation expansion and (re)forestation. Most of these activities are classified as “significant” as 
they would be implemented as best practice in any case.     
There are (as yet) no specific explicit budget lines exist for DRM/CCA. There is mention of establishing special 
funds for Disaster Management (as indicated in the DRM policy of 2011) and for climate change but no final 
decisions have been taken as yet if these are the most appropriate mechanism for Zanzibar circumstances.   
There is also still very little understanding of risk financing within the government budget.  However, there are 
signs that change is taking place. Staffs within the Ministry of Finance and the Accounting General Office are 
being trained with expertise provided by the National Board of Accountants and Auditors on risk profiles and 
management.  
While the RSBR is a useful tool to estimate to what extent the Government is investing in DRR, it is necessary to 
realise the limitations of the DRM marker, as it cannot quantify the exact amount of DRM activity and only 
provides a best estimate. Especially in the recurrent budget, it is difficult to mark investments as these are often 
divided into human resources and operating costs without directly referring to certain activities and outputs. 
                                                            
40 In reality government expenditures are not to support/repair any damages related to earthquakes. Housings regularly 
collapse in Stonetown but that is due to no maintenance. 
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Projects within the capital budgets are easier to mark but then actual expenditures are often 40 to 60% lower 
than was expected.  
C.2. Summary of Macro-Analysis / CATSIM  
(See also Annex B for theoretical and technical backgrounds and a detailed case study) 
Overview: CATSIM analysis evaluates the ability of governments to manage potential fiscal and economic risk 
arising from earthquakes. The Government is generally not responsible to provide all reconstruction needs 
because private households and businesses will assume responsibility of their own reconstruction needs. 
Therefore, we assume that the government will take the following responsibility in case of a disaster: 
• The Zanzibar government will be responsible to finance reconstruction of public assets, including roads, 
bridges, schools and hospitals, etc. (Explicit liability) 
• The Zanzibar government will extend partial support for private relief and recovery including provision of 
support to the poor (Implicit liability) 
AAL was estimated to be USD 0.18 million. Total liabilities of Zanzibar Government were estimated as USD 0.29 
billion based on capital stock data. Then, the options to finance reconstruction and recovery were examined and 
same assumptions across IOC countries are applied. As a conservative case, USD 85 million was estimated to 
be assured through diversion from budgets, domestic bonds and credit and international market borrowing.  
Combining direct risk and fiscal resource availability information compiled, we then estimated the governments’ 
potential fiscal resources gap year—the return period at which the government will face difficulty in raising 
sufficient funds for reconstruction.  
Results: It is estimated that Zanzibar has sufficient fiscal resources to cope with its earthquake risk even in the 
case of catastrophic event (500+ year event) (Figure 34). In other words, the fiscal gap for earthquake risk was 
not found in Zanzibar. While Zanzibar has up to USD 85 million available to cope with disasters excluding 
international assistance, earthquake risk is relatively low with 500 and 1000-year events expected to result in 
USD 11.4 million and USD 30.2 million in damage respectively. 
Figure 34: Resources gap year analysis for Zanzibar: No financing gap observed 
 
Source: IIASA 
The government is encouraged to take a ‘risk layered management’ approach where resources are allocated 
based on the varying levels of risk facing the country, with a priority given to reducing existing risk and preventing 
the creation of new risks in the extensive risk layer (Figure 35).  The CATSIM analysis conducted from Steps 1 to 
3 has illustrated the need for improved management of disaster risk in Zanzibar. 
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Figure 35: Risk layering approach  
    
Source: Author 
Further challenge: Data gaps and way forward 
The present study identified data gaps and sources of uncertainty regarding fiscal risk assessment. The present 
studies did not fully account for indirect effects of disaster damage, and further studies are needed to quantify 
and evaluate the indirect risks caused by disaster damage. 
For Zanzibar, there is no fiscal gap at the moment due to earthquake risk. It is important to note however that this 
assessment only pertains to the earthquake risk, and other potential hazards in Zanzibar such as flood are not 
taken into account. There is clearly a need for further investigation of such risks, evaluating the fiscal resources 
availability to cope with the potential for other catastrophic disasters. Further studies are certainly needed to 
address risks of smaller and localized events such as floods and droughts that are currently under-reported.  
Given the relatively short period of data availability, high uncertainty can be expected of catastrophic risks with 
return periods of above 500. It is advisable, therefore, further data collection, validation and analysis performed in 
an iterative fashion to reduce the range of uncertainty.   
A technical and institutional support package is necessary to establish iterative risk management system in 
Zanzibar and other IOC countries (Table 16). In terms of technical needs, knowledge regarding probabilistic risk 
assessment and economic assessment tools (CATSIM) would be needed along with general awareness of risk 
related concepts and statistics. Given the limited availability of risk experts in IOC countries, a regional approach 
to training and capacity building (e.g. regional workshop for training of trainers/ regional sharing of risk knowledge 
experts, etc.) may be an effective way to leverage local capacity and resources. Institutional support for iterative 
management should be embedded in the existing DRR/CCA policy framework of Zanzibar.  
It is important to discuss and update fiscal resilience parameter and value at critical time, for example, when 
administration changes or after disaster. Financing mechanism for disaster management (see Table 16 in 
Chapter 5) should be checked regularly. Defining government liability more concretely is also recommended. 
Some of the important policy questions to ask in Zanzibar would be: 
- What is the desirable level of fiscal preparedness in the country? What would be the policy goal in mid 
to long-term (maintain or reduce fiscal gap etc)? 
- How can you balance the need for risk reduction and risk-transfer? 
- What are the priority areas of action regarding DRR in your country? 
- What are tangible milestones and goals in the DRR priority areas in your country?    
- What further risk assessment is needed to achieve the goals of DRR priority areas in your country? 
 
Zanzibar: No gap (earthquake) 
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Table 16: Identified data gaps, technical and institutional capacity needs 
Data needs: 
-Risk information regarding additional hazards such as flood, cyclone (rain & storm surge), 
drought will improve the scope of analysis 
-Uncertainty regarding larger return period events is high given the relatively short period of 
data availability (In Component 1, loss data was collected since 1980). Further data collection 
will improve accuracy especially for higher return period events 
Technical capacity 
needs: 
-Technical training on risk assessment and economic modeling including CAPRA and 
CATSIM training.  
-Further sensitization of risk-based thinking. General familiarity of risk based terms such as 
the annual average loss, the probable maximum loss, exceedance probability must be 
explained to decision-makers.  
Institutional capacity 
needs: 
-Coordination, where both risk and socio-economic data are jointly collected and managed by 
relevant agencies (DRM agency plus Ministry of Finance). 
-Clarity on the specification of the role of each agency in data collection and analysis to avoid 
the duplication of the efforts. 
Source: Author  
C.3. Summary of Probabilistic CBA  
(See also Annex C for theoretical and technical backgrounds and a detailed case study) 
Overview: Cost benefit analysis (CBA) is an established tool in economics. This analysis can be used for both 
sectorial and project analysis. Many countries already adopt cost benefit analysis as a requirement of large-scale 
public investment projects. In this initiative, probabilistic CBA was applied to account for the benefits of risk 
reduction. The benefit is estimated by measuring how much annual average loss (AAL) will be reduced after the 
investment.As probabilistic risk assessment for flood has not been developed, historic disaster loss data were 
used as input (backward- looking probabilistic CBA).  
Case study of Zanzibar Urban Service Project: Probabilistic Cost-Benefit Analysis regarding a surface water 
drainage component of the Zanzibar Urban Services Project (ZUSP) was implemented. The process and results 
of this CBA highlight key challenges regarding limited damage and loss data available in Zanzibar. The severe 
lack of documentation regarding past disaster damage and losses seems to lead to an underestimation of 
probabilistic benefit associated with drainage improvement project— despite the reduction in expected annual 
losses of over USD 100,000, the project was evaluated to be highly cost-inefficient, with a Net Present Value 
(NPV) of USD -9.2 million evaluated at the 5% discount rate.  
The probabilistic CBA results diverge significantly from results of existing non-probabilistic CBA performed by the 
World Bank, in which the project was evaluated to be cost-efficient with an estimated NPV of over USD 20 million 
at the 7% discount rate. The extremely large difference in results between this study and that of the World Bank 
is due to differences in approach and basic assumptions. This highlights the importance of robust loss and risk 
data when assessing the economic viability of a disaster risk reduction project and the large uncertainty 
associated with data on disaster risk. 
It is also important to keep in mind that the present assessment did not take into account many of the indirect and 
intangible losses, such as loss due to business interruption and any reduction in land values that may result due 
to frequent disasters. These are clear limitations of this current analysis and further studies are certainly needed 
to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of our analysis. 
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D. Stakeholders in mainstreaming DRR/DRM/CCA in public investment 
planning 
 
Based on the analysis thus far, the main stakeholders that are involved, or should be involved in risk sensitive 
pubic investment in Zanzibar include: 
• Disaster Management Department that should ensure that planners and decision makers in the 
government institutions are aware of the country’s risk profile and realize the need for incorporating 
DRR strategies in their annual and long term planning.  
• Ministry of Finance in collaboration with the Planning Commission to set priorities and budget ceilings 
for the line ministries. Ministry of Finance also needs strategy how and where to access resources in 
case of disaster events requiring emergency funding (such as the Consolidated Fund).  
• Line ministries (health, natural resources, infrastructure, etc) to mainstream DRR in their annual and 
long term planning.   
• Disaster response agencies (police, coast guard, fire services), local government, and Bank of Tanzania 
(responsible for monetary issues). In case of emergencies, special rules may be adapted to provide 
access to additional funding for immediate relief efforts but also to reduce impact on national economy.    
• Communities through the disaster management committees at districts and shehia levels. 
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6. POLICY RECOMENDATIONS41 
In this initiative, the Zanzibar DMD established a national disaster loss database with inputs received from 
different central and local institutions. The database is shared internationally on the UNISDR website. Historical 
data range back to 1980 and were further expanded using the national archives. The currently available data 
records (155) include both disasters related to human and natural hazards. Only 10 are registered as natural 
hazards, all of which are categorised as extensive disasters. Out of the 10 reported extensive events linked to 
natural hazards, there was one life lost and material losses of USD 1.3million (88% attributed to fire; for other 
events, data are very scarce).   
The database still contains important omissions (i.e. the 205 flood-- largest in 40 years was not registered). 
Drought events have serious impacts in Zanzibar in terms of livelihoods affected and economic losses. However, 
these events are slow-onset events and not well captured in the disaster database. There is also confusion on 
definitions such as houses destroyed (a rare event in Zanzibar) versus houses flooded and/or damaged, people 
affected or evacuated (i.e. length of evacuation), “intensive versus extensive” disasters, etc.  
Zanzibar also prepared a probabilistic risk profile on earthquake in collaboration with UNISDR. The seismic risk 
in Zanzibar can be considered low. AAL is USD 0.2 million and constitutes 0.14 % of gross capital formation. 
PML is 0.4 million for 50 years of return period and it increases when return periods get longer. However, despite 
the fact that the risk is low, they should not be considered negligible because an extreme event, even if only very 
localized, can generate high disruptions, damages and casualties. 
To prepare for disaster risk, Zanzibar has the fundamentals in place for effective disaster risk management, the 
necessary legal framework, a policy, a preparedness and response plan and a communication strategy. The 
Disaster Management Department was established in 2006 and disaster committees have been set up at central 
and local levels. There is a proposal to establish a disaster management fund but that has not yet been put in 
place.  
The Government is aware of the anticipated long-term effects of climate change and the possible impact it might 
have on the frequency and intensity of disasters due to natural hazards and the need for adaptation and 
preparedness. For example, climate change is likely to increase rainfall intensity and may lead to more local 
flooding. The frequency of agricultural droughts is likely to increase and will cause economic losses and as well 
as human distress. A climate change strategy was approved in 2014.  
The MKUZA II implementation plan 2012 – 2016 allocates about 1% of the overall budget to disaster 
preparedness. Many other activities included in the budget of ministries, however, are not clearly earmarked as 
such.   
Disaster risk, however, is not well integrated into public investment planning. The budget process does not have 
clear votes that are allocated to DRM and it is difficult to get an overview of DRM investment. In this initiative, 
risk-sensitive budget review contributed to enhanced understanding of the need for comprehensive overview on 
DRR investment. CATSIM analysis presented the financial resource gap year. Though the country is likely to be 
financially well equipped for earthquake risk, it is necessary to continue the research to check the financial 
capacity against other hazards that the country is likely to be exposed to (e.g. flooding and drought).  
Probabilistic Cost-Benefit Analysis in light of a surface water drainage component of the Zanzibar Urban Services 
Project (ZUSP) highlights the importance of robust loss and risk data when assessing the economic viability of a 
disaster risk reduction project and the large uncertainty associated with data on disaster risk. 
The lack of well-documented and accepted risk profiles for the various sectors makes it difficult for planning and 
budget officers to argue for investments in specific risk mitigation and preparedness measures. While costs of 
such measures can be high, benefits maybe uncertain. There is few staff in the line ministries with economics 
background that can assist technical staff in making optimal decisions. 
There is little experience in Zanzibar in risk sensitive public investment planning and risk financing. Capacity in 
Government institutions to prepare risk profiles and design appropriate mitigation measures that balance costs 
                                                            
41 This chapter was drafted by Gerard Hendriksen. 
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and risks is still under developed. The insurance companies are only accessed by small portion of the population 
and focus on few products. This leaves the Government as the last resource to manage small or large disasters.  
Based on these conclusions, the recommendations include; 
! The Zanzibar disaster database needs to be further expanded historically but more importantly by 
incorporating the direct economic losses into the system. This requires close cooperation between the 
DMD, as the custodian of the database, and the other institutions that work on disaster risk 
management.  
 
! Government should consider both extensive and intensive risks and take risk-layered approach to 
prepare for every-day risk and catastrophe, through continuous monitoring and assessment of loss and 
risk, and capacity building of risk assessment and economic analysis. There are also issues with 
internationally used definitions that require further clarification to ensure that they are meaningful for 
conditions in Zanzibar.   
 
! The Ministry of Finance should introduce budget codes that can help to better track expenditures related 
to DRM and CCA. This will enable greater transparency, accountability and even taking credit for 
growing investments in risk reduction and management. 
 
! Further studies are needed to apply CATSIM to risks of smaller and localized events such as floods and 
droughts currently under-reported. In addition, technical and institutional support will be necessary to 
establish iterative risk management system in the IOC countries, including Zanzibar.  
 
! The Planning Commission and planning departments of the ministries require increased capacity to 
carry out meaningful CBA and verify CBA carried out by others. The use of probabilistic CBA needs to 
be further developed internally over the coming years as well as access to independent sources that 
can assist in this methodology.  
 
! Regional and/or national systems can be put into place so that each of these tools (disaster loss 
database, probabilistic risk assessment, budget review, macro-economic analysis (such as CATSIM) 
and cost benefit analysis) are updated regularly and applied as appropriate to support the Government 
of Zanzibar’s increasing focus on risk reduction and their risk-sensitive pubic investment. 
 
! In the process of capacity building for policymaking, DMD and MoF should collaborate to promote risk 
sensitive public investment planning, sectorial ministries and other key stakeholders should engage in 
the process. 
  
 70 
Annex A. Risk-Sensitive Budget Review (RSBR) 42 
A. Overview 
The objective of the Risk-Sensitive Budget Review (hereafter called budget review) is to explore the gap between 
risk level and DRR investment (Figure 36). While CATSIM analysis outlined in Annex B will identify the financial 
gap year by comparing risk and financial capacity of the country, the budget review aims to clarify what has 
already been done to reduce risk. It also checks the balance between disaster risk reduction/mitigation, 
preparedness, response and reconstruction. Understanding the costs of response and reconstruction is an 
opportunity to re-consider the importance of DRR investment. 
Figure 36: Objective of budget review 
 
Source: Author 
Budget review is expected to bring about improved efficiency and accountability. Systematic budget analysis 
requires the cooperation of all stakeholders, thereby improving budget coordination and leading to a more 
effective use of financial resources. Budget review clarifies the current level of DRR activities and enables a 
thorough analysis of the gap to explain how much funding is required for further DRR implementation. 
In the HFA Monitor, Indicator 1.2 aims to monitor the DRR budget. However, not many countries report their 
budgets due to lack of monitoring system for their DRR budget. Table 17 below, shows the reported value in 
selected countries. While we need to be cautious when comparing the values across countries, due to the 
application of different counting methods, this table shows that out of five countries, three invested significantly 
more in relief and reconstruction than in DRR and prevention. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42 Section A-C of this chapter were drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR) and Section D was drafted by Gerard Hendriksen. 
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Table 17: DRR Budget in selected countries (% of total budget) 
Country Year DRR and 
prevention 
(%) 
Relief and 
Reconstruction     
(%) 
Total        
(%) 
Belarus 2013 0.160 0.160 0.320 
Ecuador 2013 0.300 1.600 1.900 
Indonesia 2013 0.286 0.413 0.699 
Mozambique 2013 4.610 0.350 4.960 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2012 0.100 1.000 1.100 
Source: Author based on HFA Progress Report for each country 
In response to the need for DRM budget monitoring, several initiatives have progressed to date. The first effort 
has been to create a consolidated budget line for DRM. This approach has mainly been taken in Latin American 
countries.  For example, Columbia established the Adaptation Fund (2010). Mexico has been utilizing the Natural 
Disaster Prevention Fund (FOPREDEN), the Natural Disaster Fund (FONDEN) and the Fund for Assistance of 
the Affected Rural Populations by Climate Contingencies (FAPRAC). Peru has also established a National 
Budgetary Programme for Vulnerability Reduction and Emergency Response. 
The second effort is to assign codes to budgetary line items that indicate DRM measures. This is promoted by 
the World Bank and OECD in partnership with the UNISDR; they propose the “DRM marker” to monitor DRM 
elements in Official Development Assistances (ODAs) which are registered in OECD’s Credit Reporting 
System43. DRM marking allows the monitoring of donors’ policy objectives in relation to DRM in each aid activity. 
Compared to consolidated budget lines, the DRM marker is a less drastic reform and has potential to be the first 
and simplest analytical step toward risk-sensitive public investment. Therefore, the DRM Marker, with some 
adjustment, was applied to Zanzibar. 
B. DRM Marker 
The DRM marker allows (a) capturing “embedded” investment by distinguishing between stand-alone versus 
mainstreamed DRR investment (e.g. retrofitting in school renovation program), (b) strengthening the ability to 
analyse, measure and report activities in DRR, and (c) improving regulatory conditions to facilitate tracking of 
budgetary allocations and expenditure in DRR and even (d) tracking pre-disaster (DRR) versus post-disaster 
(relief/reconstruction) investments, with simple addition of a rule. 
The first eligibility criterion for an element to be marked is that DRM must be included in “the programme 
objectives” (Figure 37). The DRM element is defined as any “strategy, policy, effort or measure that improves the 
understanding of disaster risk, fosters disaster risk reduction or transfer, and promotes continuous improvement 
in disaster preparedness, response and recovery practices” (OECD, 201444). If a budgeted activity meets any of 
those elements, it becomes “marked” as DRM.  
The second level criterion is to examine how important the DRM objective is to drive implementation of the 
activity. The exact question is “would the aid activity have been undertaken without that DRR objective?” If the 
answer is affirmative, then it is marked as “significant” and if negative, it is marked as “principal”45. 
                                                            
43 The Rio Marker monitors CCA aid activity since 2011. DRM Marker is proposed using the similar methodology. 
44 OECD, 2014. A Proposal to Establish a Policy Marker for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in the OECD DAC Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS). 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT%282014%293&docLanguage=En 
45 Still certain level of ambiguity remains. For example, distinction between principal and significant is not clear and might 
require subjective judgment. However this is a notable progress for systematic monitoring. 
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Figure 37: DRM Marker process 
 
Source: OECD (2014) 
By applying this DRM Marker methodology across time and space, it is expected that data homogeneity and 
comparability will be assured. Furthermore, especially by introducing the “significant” category, incentives to 
mainstream DRM in development activities become visible. In the past, DRM has conventionally been delivered 
through stand-alone projects. However with progress achieved in implementing the HFA, more governments 
have been recognizing development mechanisms and instruments as important to reduce risks and strengthen 
resilience. It becomes more important to monitor a wide number of DRR related projects and investments 
embedded across different sectors either at central or local government levels in order to provide comprehensive 
overview of DRR policies.   
In spite of such benefits, it is necessary to clarify the limitations of the DRM marker. The DRM marker cannot 
quantify the exact amount of DRM activity and only provides a best estimate. It is often impossible to extract a 
DRM element from overall programmes/projects, therefore overall programme/project budget are registered, 
leading to over-estimation of DRM budget. Furthermore, because the objective of the activity is the only criteria 
used to “mark” the budget item as DRM, if policy makers are unaware of DRM benefits, the activity will never be 
“marked“. While it is clear to most that flood control and early warning are DRR policies, policy makers may not 
naturally recognize the contributions to reduce disaster vulnerability made, for example, by poverty reduction and 
ecosystem restoration. In this regard, a DRM Marker system may miss DRR elements embedded in all 
development activities. The DRR activities, which must have DRR elements but are not recognized as DRR, 
might underline an awareness gap of policy makers in the given sector. 
C. The budget review methodology: Application of DRM marker 
In applying the methodology of the DRM Marker in a risk-sensitive budget review, the following three steps were 
taken (Figure 38, Annex A-1 for more details). The first step is to define what should be monitored, i.e. the scope 
of the budget review. In the DRM Marker, the target was ODA data stored in OECD Credit Reporting System. 
However, in budget review, the scope of review needs to be clarified in the given context.  
Then, the second step is to mark budget line items as significant and principal using DRM Marker criteria, count 
the budget in each item and sum up the value. In this step, sub-categories based on DRM elements is added to 
the original DRM Marker to show the balance between DRR (including prevention and preparedness) and 
disaster management (response and recovery). The last step aims to assess the resulting gap by comparing 
budget with risk. This analysis enables the identification of lessons to feed into the following year’s budget. 
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Figure 38: Risk sensitive budget review process 
 
Source: Author 
In defining the scope of budget review, the following four aspects need to be clarified. The first is the coverage of 
monitored entities. Public sector consists of general government and state corporations. General government 
consists of central and sub-national governments. In developing countries, donor finance is also a non-negligible 
component of budget. 
The second is whether to monitor budget or expenditure. In the context of developing countries, very often 
expenditure is far below the budget especially in capital investment due to its disposal of donor relationship.  
The third point is whether to monitor current or capital budget/expenditure. Most infrastructures are classified 
under capital budget/expenditure, with sometimes multi-year budget commitment. Considering the importance of 
DRR in public investment, monitoring capital budget/expenditure is necessary. At the same time, current 
budget/expenditure includes important items such as expenses for training and early warning. Ideally, both 
should be monitored.  
Lastly, there is often no disagreement in including activities targeted at geological (e.g. earthquake, tsunami, 
landslide), meteorological (e.g. cyclone, heat wave) and hydrological hazards (e.g. flood, landslide, drought). 
However, depending on countries context, epidemics and other hazards may also be included. 
In Step 2, while the marking process based on DRM Marker methodology highlights investments in DRM in 
monetary terms, a parallel “tagging” process categorizes each marked activity as one of four components of 
DRM:  prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and reconstruction. Tagging is most easily represented as 
percentages in each category, the four categories summing to 100% of marked elements46.  
When each marked item is “tagged” in this way, we can start to understand how investments are distributed 
before and after a disaster. As countries can demonstrate more and more investment on the side of DRR 
(including prevention and preparedness), they can prove that they are accountable for risk reduction. As the 
value rises in components tagged as DRR, it will normally become evident that less funding is required in the 
post-disaster phase (response and reconstruction). 
 
 
                                                            
46 In reality, the four components overlap. For example, some elements of reconstruction may be devoted to future disaster risk 
prevention/mitigation. However, for simplification, items are classified and tagged for four components based on their greatest 
contribution. 
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D. The risk sensitive budget review in Zanzibar 
D.1. Scope of analysis 
The scope of the budget review is defined as follows (Table 18). 
Table 18: Scope of the risk sensitive budget review 
Year The budget 2014/15 
Coverage Government budget for FY 2014/15. Focus was on 11 ministries and 
institutions which are most involved in DRM and CC. 
Budget or 
expenditure 
Budget  
Current or Capital Both current and capital budgets 
Targeted hazards Fires, droughts, human and animal epidemics and long term effects of climate 
change 
 
Year/Period 
The risk sensitive budget review in Zanzibar has focused on the annual budget for the current financial year 
2014/15. The national budget was approved by parliament in July 2014. This is the most recent budget available 
and includes under “Capital Expenditures” the development projects funded by the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar (RGZ) and the development partners. However, it should be noted here that there are often large 
differences between the approved budgets and the actual expenditures (see Chapter1).  
Coverage:  
The Zanzibar government budget 2014/15 has been reviewed for ministries and institutions that are expected to 
somehow contribute to risk management (DRM and CCA) issues in terms of expenditures. These include: 
 
• Second Vice President’s office that covers the Disaster Management Department 
• First Vice President’s office including Department of Environment and the CC unit 
• Regional Administration (under the President’s Office) 
• Ministry of Agricultural and Natural Resources (Forestry) 
• Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries and Coastal Systems 
• Ministry of Health 
• Ministry of Land, Housing, Water and Energy 
• Ministry of Infrastructure and Communication 
• Tourist Commission 
• Fire and rescue services 
• Consolidated fund services used primarily for debt services but also miscellaneous expenditures. This 
can include disaster response if these are above the capacity of the ministries directly involved.   
 
Table 19 below shows the recurrent and capital budget for the selected Ministries and institutions as these 
represent the ones making important contributions to risk reduction and response. Zanzibar’s budget has in total 
52 votes for Ministries and Government Institutions. The allocation of the Consolidated Fund Services (vote 45) is 
very high as compared to other budget lines as it includes reservations for payments of debt services.  At the 
same time this budget line is used for unplanned expenses such as in the case of disasters that are going 
beyond the capacity of the line ministries.  
The cumulative recurrent budget of the ministries (as per list above) represents 37% of the total Zanzibar 
government recurrent budget. For the capital budget this goes up to 72%. This share is very high due to the 
construction costs of the new international airport under the Ministry of Infrastructure and Communications. The 
further analysis in this review highlights proportions of the total national budget. 
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Table 19: Budgets of the ministries/ institutions reviewed. (Tsh thousands) 
 
 
The annexes to this chapter illustrate the layout of the Zanzibar Government budget:   
1) Overview of the budget of all Government ministries and institutions in Zanzibar (Annex A.2).  
2) Example of the detailed budget for the Ministry of Agriculture (Annex A.3) 
3) Detailed budget for one department (Annex A.4) 
 
Discussions were held with staff in the planning department in the ministries and other institutions to get more 
information on the programs mentioned in the budget and to establish if these could be considered as having any 
relation to risk reduction. 
Budget or Expenditure  
As written above, there are reported significant differences between the budget that results from the budget 
preparation process and the actual expenses during the financial year. This is partly caused by the fact that 
during the planning process, not all details may be known and imperfect estimates are provided. During 
implementation, changes between the budget lines are made after gaining approval from the Principal Secretary 
of the concerned Ministry.  
The more serious problem is external financing from various development partners, which provides 37% of the 
total national budget of 2014/15 and is mostly directed towards the capital expenditure as indicated in the Table 
20 below.47 The high dependency of the government budget and in particular the capital budget on funding from 
external sources, makes implementation of the programs and projects risky. Anticipated external funding may be 
delayed or even withdrawn depending on conditions that are often beyond the control of the Government of 
Zanzibar. Another aspect is that by far the largest part of external funding is through loans from international 
development banks (World Bank, AfDB, Korean EXIM Bank, BADEA and OPEC fund) that will result in increased 
pressure on the Zanzibar budgets when repayments are due. Most of these larger loans are for infrastructure 
projects such as the new airport facilities and road construction. These are not directly related to increased 
preparedness for natural hazards although they might have some additional provisions to withstand extreme 
natural events for instance large drainage systems to accommodate the expected higher rainfall intensities. 
The Bank of Tanzania in its annual reports mentions  that the Government total expenditures were well below the 
proposed annual budgets of the past five years.  While the recurrent budget is usually only a few percentage 
points different, the capital expenditures are 40 – 60% below the planned figures. The reason given is 
unavailabbility of donor funding which impacts in particular on the development expenditures. 
                                                            
47 Some funding is coming through General Budget Support (GBS) provided to the United Republic of Tanzania. Zanzibar is 
entitled to a share of 4.5% of this GBS funding. 
Vote Description recurrent  budget
capital  
budget
total       
budget
5 Second  VP Office 4,110,200         3,882,880        7,993,080         
6 First VP Office 2,928,700         2,200,000        5,128,700         
9 Regional  Admin (PO Office) 4,036,400         200,000            4,236,400         
20 Agriculture 13,758,000       9,611,002        23,369,002       
22 Livestock & Fisheries 4,250,500         7,340,553        11,591,053       
24 Health 22,747,200       28,206,897      50,954,097       
25 Min of LHW&E 7,760,100         26,798,858      34,558,958       
26 Min of Infrastructure 4,416,900         160,140,910   164,557,810     
31 Tourist commission 1,387,658         250,000            1,637,658         
32 Fire and Rescue Force 3,113,000         3,113,000         
45 Consolidated Fund Services 69,875,100       69,875,100       
Total Selected budget 138,383,758     238,631,100   377,014,858     
Total Gov budget 2014/15 376,490,900     331,341,400   707,832,300     
Budget share reviewed as share 
of the total budget
37% 72% 53%
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Table 20: Zanzibar budget 2014-15 and share of external funding 
Description  Tsh billion % 
Recurrent budget 376 53% 
Capital budget (internal) 66 9% 
Capital budget (external, grants and loans)  265 37% 
Total Government budget 708 100% 
      Source: Author based on Zanzibar budger 2014/15 
Within the context of this report it was not possible to find figures comparing budgets and expenditures for 
previous years. The official records of the actual expenditures of the previous budget year become available only 
after about six months after the end of the financial year in June. The latest actual expenditures records available 
for review are from the financial year 2012/13. The figures for the year 2013/14 were still under preparation 
during the time of the review. For this reason, the budget was used for the present analysis, and not the 
expenditures. 
In the Zanzibar budget the word “expenditure” is used even for the current budget, although in reality these are 
estimates and not actual expenditures.  
Capital (investment) or Current budget 
The risk sensitive budget review for 2014/15 covered both recurrent and capital Expenditures. The capital 
expenditures are largely funded with support of development partners.   
Targeted disasters 
The Zanzibar budget review targets geological (e.g. earthquake, tsunami), and hydrological (e.g. flood, drought)48 
disasters, as well as epidemics. 
Documents available and used for the risk sensitive budget review 
The overall Government budget for all ministries and institutions covers about 500 pages with the detailed line 
budgets. The software used by the Ministry of Finance does not provide for a softcopy of the total government 
budget in excel format, which would have made the review easier to conduct. Instead hardcopies of the Budget 
are printed and distributed through the Government once the budget has been approved by the House of 
Representatives. For the present review, early printouts were provided for each of the ten selected government 
institutions. The budget portrays the recurrent expenditures (and recurrent revenues for some) and the capital 
expenditures for 2014/15 
We have also reviewed special programs that are thought to be of particular relevance for DRM/CCA to get a 
better understanding of the nature of the proposed expenses. These include:  
1) The Zanzibar Urban Support Program (ZUSP) supported by World Bank. It has components on solid 
waste management, seawall (re) construction and improvement of urban drainage; 
2) Agricultural Services Support Programme (ASSP) and Agricultural Sector Development Programme – 
Livestock (ASDP-L) supported by International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) among others; 
3) Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) to expand rice production through improved 
seeds and management practices; 
4) Korean Irrigation project for approximately 2000 ha;  
5) Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) III which includes the Productive Social Safety Net, the 
Livelihoods Enhancement and the Targeted Infrastructure Development at local level;  
6) Zanzibar food security and nutrition framework from Ministry of Agriculture; 
7) Ministry of Health Plan of Action 2013/14 (one of the ministries that is piloting performance based 
budgeting. 
 
                                                            
48 There are no major meteorological disasters in Zanzibar. 
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These projects are usually implemented over a number of years and are mostly, but not always reflected in the 
capital budget. Another issue is that in case of delays, the same amount might return in budgets of following 
years and this partly explains why the implementation of the capital budgets is reported to be only 40-60% 
according to the Bank of Tanzania annual reports.   
D.2. RSBR Results  
Table 21 provides an overview the Zanzibar Government budget 2014/15 that have been identified as 
contributing to DRM and CCA using the DRM marker methodology described above.  
Table 21: DRM/CCA related budgets in Zanzibar 2014/15 budget (million Tsh)49  
 
Note: categories refer to the components of DRM shown in Table 21 (1: Prevention/mitigation; 2: Preparedness; 3: Response 
and 4: Reconstruction). 
Source: Author based on Budget 2014/15 
 
                                                            
49 In the review, the author did not find any clear budgets related to DRR in Ministry of Infrastructure and the Tourism 
Commission. 
 
Significant Principal 
Second Vice 
President's Office
Dep of Disaster Management (recurrrent costs)                    -                      263 2 DRM
First Vice President's 
office
Dep of Environment                 113                       -   1 DRM
First Vice President's 
office Strengthening Environment and CC in Zanzibar                    -                      800 2 CC
Min of Agriculture, Dep of Forestry and Natural Resources              1,605                       -   1 CC
Min of Agriculture, Department of irrigation                 725                       -   1 CC
Institute of Agric Research              1,221                       -   1 CC
Dep of Forestry and NRNR, Pemba                   95                       -   1 CC
Dep of Irrigation Pemba                   90                       -   1 CC
Institute of Agric Research, Pemba                   66                       -   1 CC
Irrigation program (Korea Support)              4,258                       -   1 CC
Community forest Management Program (HIMA)                   64                       -   1 CC
Agr and Nat Resources Research                 300                       -   1 CC
Min ofLivestock and 
Fisheries 
Dep of Veterinary Services Pemba                   51                       -   1 DRM
Dep of Veterinary Services                 704                       -   1 DRM
Control Bird Flue project                   67                       -   1 DRM
Rabies control project Project,   WSPA support                 281                       -   1 DRM
Min of Health Preventive Department                 250                       -   1 DRM
Preventive Department Pemba                 145                       -   1 DRM
Zanzibar Malaria Control Program              2,900                       -   1 DRM
Zanzibar Health Promotion              1,310                       -   1 DRM
Min of Lands Housing 
Water and Energy ZNZ Alternative source energy              1,841                       -   1 CC
Sustainable Management of Land and Environment 
Project
                948                       -   1 CC
                   -                         -   
Fire/ Rescue Force (Unguja)                    -                   3,113 3 DRM
Totals 17,035           4,176                
Grand total (Significant and Principal) 21,210           
Ministry/  Institution Budgeted Activity Name Budget  (Tsh millions) Category DRM / CCA
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Table 22 below shows that the overall estimated investment in DRM/CCA identified in this review adds up to Tsh 
21 billion (USD 0.2 million) which is about 3% of the total Zanzibar budget of Tsh 708 billion (about USD 440 
million).  Out of 21 Tsh million, most (2.4 out of 3%) are marked as “significant”. The vast majority of marked 
elements being “significant” indicates a very horizontally integrated DRR investment in DRR, reflecting a positive 
move towards mainstreaming DRR. 
The review divided the budgets in terms of: 
• Significant (the intervention would have taken place even without DRM/CCA objective) :Examples are 
programs implemented under Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources to improve forestry cover 
and increase irrigation facilities, preventative disease programs from the Ministry of Health, the new 
renewable energy program supported by the EU in collaboration with ZECO (the electricity utility 
company).   
• Principal (the intervention has a specific DRM/CCA objective): Examples are the cost of the Disaster 
Risk Management Department of the Second Vice President’s office and the work being done to 
mainstream climate change adaptation in Government’s planning and budgets through the UNDAP 
program under the First Vice President’s office.  
 
The budgets can also be divided between DRM and CCA investments and this is shown in the last column of 
Table 22. The analysis shows that 43% of the identified budgets are DRM related and these are in particular for 
activities implemented through the Ministry of Health. The balance of 57% has been classified as CCA-related, 
mainly in the agricultural and environment sectors such as for agricultural research and irrigation development.  
Table 22: Share of DRM/CCA as percentage of total Government budget 
  Significant Principal Total 
Totals DRM/CC budget allocations  Tsh 17.0 billion  Tsh 4.2  billion Tsh 21.2  billion 
Percentage of overall budget 2.4% 0.6% 3.0% 
Source: Author based on Zanzibar Budget 2014/15 
Table 23 below provides an overview of the Tsh 21.2 billion for DRM/CCA interventions found in the 2014/15 
budget. The review did not come across any intervention to classify as reconstruction. This is not surprising as 
Zanzibar has not experienced any major disasters over the last years that needed rebuilding of infrastructure. 
Expenses for minor damages and repairs to infrastructure may be hidden within the recurrent and capital budgets 
for the overall annual maintenance requirements.  
Table 23: DRM/CCA investments in 4 DRM sub-components (Tsh billion), 2014/2015 budget 
Budget allocations per Risk Management 
phase/category 
Significant Principal Total 
 
Percentage 
Prevention/mitigation (1) 17.0  17.0 80% 
Preparedness  (2)   1.0 1.0 5% 
Response (3)  3.1 3.1 15% 
Reconstruction (4)   0.0 0% 
Total budget allocations    21.2 100% 
Share of total budget (Tsh 708 billion) 2.4% 0.6% 3.0% - 
Source: Author based on Zanzibar Budget 2014/15 
• Prevention/mitigation accounts for 80% of the activities and this is due to the large investments in 
prevention of human and livestock diseases such as for instance the malaria and bird flu control 
programs respectively.   
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• To increase resilience against climate change there are significant investments in irrigation with support 
of the Korean government that is expected to increase the current irrigated area of around 500 ha with 
another 2000 ha. Agricultural research is focusing on water harvesting, drought resistant varieties and 
other technologies that can improve rice yields in non-irrigated areas. The costs of these programs are 
included in the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and for this review have been classified as 
prevention/mitigation as it prepares the sector for the predicted increase in dry spells.   
 
• In the category preparedness, the review has included the budgets for the Disaster Management 
Department in the Second Vice President’s Office and the strengthening and mainstreaming of climate 
change program in the First Vice President’s office.  
 
• The budget allocation for the Fire and Rescue Force has been categorised under the category response 
as the interventions are mostly directly related to disaster events. However, most of these fire services 
respond to purely man-made events. 
 
• There were no interventions included in the category reconstruction due to the fact that fortunately 
Zanzibar has not experienced large disasters of natural origin in recent years.  
 
 
D.3. Gap between loss, risk and DRM budget 
Components 2 of the project determined an average annual loss of USD 0.2 million to earthquakes in Zanzibar. 
The overall estimated investment in DRM/CCA identified for 2014/15 (one year) totals USD 0.2 million (Tsh 21 
billion) (Table 24).  
Table 24: DRR budget, loss and risk  
 
DRR budget, 2013/14 
AAL 
(Earthquake only) 
Loss, 1980-2014 
(10 data cards) 
Value 
 
USD 0.2 million USD 0.2 million 
USD 1.3 million  
(Annual average: 
USD 0.04 million) 
Status  NO GAP NO GAP 
Source: Author 
A simple comparison of AAL to the most current annual investment in DRR indicates an equal balance. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that AAL is only estimated for earthquake risk and to go back to the 
actual marked activities to determine their link to earthquake risk. If this 2014/15 investment could be reasonably 
linked to earthquake risk reduction, it would seem to offset the AAL by many years. However, the assumption of 
linkage with earthquake seems unreasonable given recent low frequency and intensity of earthquake in Zanzibar. 
As a reference, loss data was also compared to the budget. This comparison, especially when expressed per 
year during the reference period, shows a positive balance. However, given that only 10 cards are registered for 
disaster loss database, assuming it is incomplete, this also merits caution.  
Although this is only a very simple and straightforward example that cannot be extrapolated to other hazards or 
years, it serves to underscore the utility of both the AAL/past loss data and the budget review as a combined tool 
to move Zanzibar towards risk-sensitive public investment in light of their most important natural hazards. 
D.4. Challenges Experienced in Conducting Risk Sensitive Budget Review 
Planning and technical staff in sectorial ministries is only partly aware of DRM and what it could mean for their 
institutions. Disasters are largely seen as human related due to severity of the recent marine accidents. They are 
considered to be the prime responsibility of the Department for Disaster Management in the Second Vice 
President’s Office, Climate Change Unit of the First President’s Office, and the relief services, fire brigade, police 
and defence forces. On the other hand, staffs in the ministries of health and livestock classify some of their 
programs as prevention and disaster preparedness (epidemic related) and such programmes were readily 
included in this budget review.  
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While the DMD is well established with dedicated staff and budget, this is less obvious for climate change which 
is situated under the First Vice President’s Office and has very limited resources in terms of manpower and 
funding. The Government has programs to mainstream Climate Change in all ministries but that is still in its early 
stages.  However, ministerial staff is more aware of climate change issues and the possible long-term impacts. 
Changing weather patterns, sea level rise, increased beach erosion and salt-water intrusion are often mentioned 
in this context.  
The RSBR scoped for interventions that can be categorized as disaster risk reduction such as water 
management, irrigation expansion and (re)forestation. Most of these activities are classified as “significant” as 
they would be implemented as best practice in any case.     
There are (as yet) no specific explicit budget lines exist for DRM/CCA. There is mention of establishing special 
funds for Disaster Management (as indicated in the DRM policy of 2011) and for climate change but no final 
decisions have been taken as yet if these are the most appropriate mechanism for Zanzibar circumstances.   
There is also still very little understanding of risk financing within the government budget.  However, there are 
signs that change is taking place. Staffs within the Ministry of Finance and the Accounting General Office are 
being trained with expertise provided by the National Board of Accountants and Auditors on risk profiles and 
management.  
D.5. Next Steps to be considered: Other Levels and Categories  
State Owned Enterprises 
Zanzibar has a number of state owned enterprises in various sectors such as the utility companies, banking, 
harbour and airport facilities and in the hotel industry. The Government is in the process of disinvesting from 
some of these enterprises to reduce the burden on the budget as well as to improve services. Within the context 
of this survey the utility companies are the most relevant. 
The Zanzibar Water Authority (ZAWA) is a semi-autonomous entity charged with the overall management of 
water supply services and water resource management in the islands. The national demographic survey of 2010 
reports that 57% of the population has access to improved water sources.  ZAWA is expected to collect revenues 
from water sales to meet costs of operation and maintenance. The work is in progress with the installation of 
water meters and the collection of water bills. ZAWA also has an important function in water conservation and 
reduction of water losses. Currently ZAWA is also setting up a water resource monitoring and management 
system and plays a crucial role in bringing together the different stakeholders in the water sector.  
ZAWA is supported by a number of donor agencies of which the African Development Bank (ADB) and JICA are 
the largest investors in rehabilitation of existing systems as well as expansion.  ZAWA is the largest single 
consumer of electricity on the islands to operate the pumps on wells and distribution networks. There are 
opportunities to reduce water losses and to increase pump efficiencies, interventions that could be classified as 
climate change mitigation. There is currently no evidence that there are specific investments to increase pumping 
efficiencies apart from a study under the ADB program that has highlighted the extent of the issue.    
Zanzibar Electricity Corporation (ZECO) is the sole distributor of electricity on the islands. The electricity access 
rate was reported to be 38% in 2010 by the national surveys but ZECO claims that to date it reaches 56% of the 
population based on the number of connections. The distribution system reaches to practically all corners of the 
islands covering all five Regions and ten Districts. ZECO procures electricity in bulk from mainland Tanzania 
through submarine cables. It has backup diesel generators but these are rarely used due to the high costs.  
ZECO is supported by a number of donors (Norway, Sweden (SIDA) and Japan (JICA)) mainly to expand the 
distribution network and reduce losses. The EU has a program to assess the potential of alternative, renewable 
energy sources and this is focussing on wind and solar. Future investments in these technologies will to a large 
extent be based on the results of the assessments and will at least take a number of years.  
 
 
 
 81 
Local Authorities 
Zanzibar has five regions distributed over the two islands Unguja and Pemba.  The total budget for 2014/15 for 
these five regions is Tsh 8 billion, just over 1% of the overall national budget of Tsh 708 billion. With very limited 
local tax, this means the regions have very limited resources and capacity to implement programs. The 
Government has a policy to increase the role of the regions and districts over the coming years.  
The Zanzibar Municipal Council (ZMC) is an important local governance institution and responsible for the Mijini 
(Town) district, the economic, political and cultural centre of the islands. The district and the surrounding urban 
areas have a population of about 600,000 persons. Due to the high population pressure, it is also the area that is 
most affected by local flooding and poor waste management.   
External Finance 
The World Bank Zanzibar Urban Support Program (ZUSP) has provided a loan of USD 31millon to the 
Government to support the ZMC and related government authorities in the following areas:  
1) Institutional Strengthening of ZMC (USD 4.3 million). 
2) Indicative Structure Plan for the ZMC (USD 2.2 million to provide long term direction in different 
sectors such as roads, water supply, sewerage). 
3) Construction of storm water drainage channels and surface water drains (USD 10.8 million)50 
4) Street lighting in the ZMC areas (USD 2.6 million). 
5) Solid waste collection and transportation (USD 2.8 million).  
6) Construction of sea wall and promenade within Stone Town (USD 8.5 million)  
 
The project implementation period is 2011-2016. Currently the large physical investments for drainage (estimated 
at USD10.8 million) and seawall (estimated at USD 8.5 million) are in the procurement stage and the tendering 
process is expected to be completed before 31 December 2014. Construction will take a number of years and 
funding will be released according to the contractual agreements. The disbursement in the financial 2014/15 is 
not yet determined.   
 
 
  
                                                            
50 This component was examined for the cost benefit analysis in Annex C. 
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Annex A-1. CHECKLIST for a risk-sensitive budget review 
 
  
CHECKLIST to CONDUCT a RISK-SENSITIVE BUDGET REVIEW (RSBR) 
1. DETERMINE WHAT SHOULD BE COUNTED 
a. IDENTIFY YEAR / PERIOD that is appropriate and feasible 
EXAMPLE: last fully-completed year or current year underway 
ADVICE: Start with a single year, add other periods later, as feasible. 
b. DETERMINE COVERAGE 
EXAMPLE: all public sector (general and state corporations) or only General budget (central and/or sub-national budgets) 
ADVICE: All public sector is desirable, but start with central budget and budget of national disaster management entity before moving onto other budgets. 
Smaller countries should be able to review all. 
c. IDENTIFY BASIS FOR REVIEW 
EXAMPLE 1: budget or expenditure? 
ADVICE: if difference between two is large, go with expenditure; if small, go with budget. 
EXAMPLE 2: investment (capital) and/or consumption (current)? 
ADVICE: ideal to use both, usually reported separately in budget 
2. OBTAIN COPIES of budgets covering all elements determined above 
EXAMPLE: hard-copy or electronic copy—with ‘objectives’ stipulated per line item in enough detail to conduct next steps 
ADVICE: review / study guidance for DRM Marker, taking note of the “eligibility criteria” discussion on pp3-4: (Review document entitled: DAC Working 
Party on Development Finance Statistics, A Proposal to Establish a Policy Marker for DRM in the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, 2014) 
3. MARK and TAG BUDGETARY ELEMENTS  
a. DRM MARKING: go through the budget(s) line by line, asking the question(s) at each line:  
• “do any objectives of the budgeted activity meet any ‘eligibility criteria’ of the DRM marker? 
• “If yes, would the budgeted activity have been undertaken without that DRM objective?” 
ADVICE: Using spreadsheet, record total of the budget activity in three categories: Principle (2), Significant (1) and not marked (0) for easy summing 
b. DRM TAGGING: go through the budget(s) again line by line, to categorize each MARKED activity by scheme in 3a above: “what percentage of total 
MARKED items fit best under prevention/mitigation, preparedness, relief and reconstruction?” 
ADVICE: Work with DRM entity in your country to determine the best categorization 
EXAMPLE: the most common standard is: 1. Prevention/mitigation, 2. Preparedness, 3. Response and 4. Reconstruction 
4. CALCULATE AND COMPARE DRM INVESTMENT 
a. Sum DRM/CCA investment per marker and DRM sub-category 
b. Calculate gap by comparing sum with Risk/Loss data (Comp 1/2) 
c. Document lessons learned 
d. Time allowing, repeat all of the above with additional years, budgets, sectors, etc.  
 84 
Annex A-2. Zanzibar Government Budget 2014/15 (in millions Tsh) *) 
 
*): This is to illustrate how budget document looks like. The budget is based on an overview provided to the 
consultant during the RSBR exercise and not the final version approved by the House of Representatives. There 
have been some minor differences between the version for the risk sensitive budget review and the final version.   
  
Vote Description 
recurrent  
budget
Dev Local Foreign Aids
Total Dev 
Budget
Total Budget 
2014/15
5 Second  VP Office 4,110               1,100               2,783               3,883               7,993               
6 First VP Office 2,929               1,400               800                  2,200               5,129               
7 Office Intern Cooperation (DIAS) 808                  -                   808                  
8 PO Revolutionary Council (MBLM) 1,458               -                   1,458               
9 Regional  Admin (PO Office) 4,036               200                  200                  4,236               
10 PO, State House an Good Governance 5,107               530                  530                  5,637               
11 Office of Controller and AG office 2,023               -                   2,023               
12 zanzibar Commisssion for Aids 811                  50                     1,281               1,331               2,142               
14 High Court Zanzibar 5,037               700                  700                  5,737               
15 Attorney General office 999                  -                   999                  
16 House of representatives 14,565            711                  711                  15,275            
17 Economic Brigade 9,483               150                  150                  9,633               
18 ZNZ Training Centre for Offender 7,491               200                  200                  7,691               
19 Min of Finance 27,768            27,203            14,294            41,497            69,265            
20 Agriculture 13,758            1,500               8,111               9,611               23,369            
21 Min of Trade, Industries and Marketing 3,531               2,336               2,336               5,866               
22 Livestock & Fisheries 4,251               700                  6,641               7,341               11,591            
23 Min of Educatin & Vocational Training 86,202            3,300               24,133            27,433            113,634          
24 Min of Health 22,747            3,850               24,357            28,207            50,954            
25 Min of Lands, Housing, Water & Energy 7,760               3,950               22,849            26,799            34,559            
26 Min of Infrastructure & Comm 5,678               8,400               151,741          160,141          165,819          
27 President's office Labor nd Public Services 4,181               300                  28                     328                  4,509               
28 Min of Employment, Soc Welfare, Youth, Women 3,641               1,524               2,406               3,930               7,571               
29 Anti Smuggling Unit 11,567            500                  500                  12,067            
30 Zanzibar Electroral Commission 1,314               1,750               1,750               3,064               
31 Tourist commission 1,389               -                   1,389               
32 Fire and Rescue Force 3,788               -                   3,788               
34 People Voluntia Unit 4,660               -                   4,660               
35 Office of Directro of Public Prosecutions 1,366               200                  200                  1,566               
36 Ministry of Constitution and Legal Affairs 3,109               200                  1,580               1,780               4,889               
42 Min of Information, Tourisnm, Culture and Sports 7,982               5,995               5,995               13,977            
43 Zanzibar Registration& Identity Card Office 1,939               -                   1,939               
44 Min of State (PO) Public Service and Good Governance -                   -                   -                   
45 Consolidated Fund Services 69,825            -                   69,825            
46 Law Review Commission 498                  -                   498                  
47 Public Service Commission 754                  -                   754                  
48 Civil Service Commission 611                  -                   611                  
49 Planning Commission 3,339               1,612               1,979               3,591               6,930               
50 Corruption and Economic Crimes Authority 815                  -                   815                  
51 National Commision for coordiantion and control of drugs364                 -                   364                  
52 Referal Mnazi Mmoja Hospital 8,282               -                   8,282               
UN Unallocated 8,500               -                   8,500               
Sub total 368,475          65,900            265,442          331,342          699,817          
REGIONS
37 Urban West Region (U) 1,758               1,758               
38 South Region (U) 1,337               1,337               
39 North Region (U) 1,363               1,363               
40 South Region (P) 1,917               1,917               
41 North Region (P) 1,642               1,642               
Sub total 8,016               -                   -                   -                   8,016               
Total Gov budget 2014/15 376,491          65,900            265,442          331,342          707,833          
Total Selected budget 140,271          21,100            217,281          238,381          378,652          
Budget share reviwed as share of the total 
budget
37% 32% 82% 72% 53%
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Annex A-3.  Example of Budget 2014/15 (Ministry of Agriculture) 
 
  
Vote 
20 Min of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Recurrent expenditures
subvote 2012/13 (actual) 2013/14 (approved) 2014/15 (estimate)
0301 Head Office Pemba 1,644,215,898            
0401 Dep Planning, Policy and Research 628,350,735               449,548,000               377,129,000              
0402 Kizimbani Agric College 288,800,000               500,000,000               427,000,000              
0701 Dep of Forestry and NRNR 1,224,181,025            1,299,318,000            1,605,448,000          
1101 Dep of Irrigation 571,469,800               607,066,000               725,370,000              
1301 Dep Admin & HR 712,520,052               1,130,634,000            1,543,027,000          
1401 Dep of Food Security and Nutrition 202,613,350               172,188,000               194,500,000              
1501 Dep of Agriculture 5,113,513,078            5,649,736,000            4,802,444,000          
1701 Institute of Agric Research 834,140,250               967,498,000               1,221,269,000          
1702 Planning and Policy Dep Pemba 25,080,000                  60,000,000                
1703 Dep of Forestry and NRNR, Pemba 88,760,000                  94,960,000                
1704 Dep of Irrigation Pemba 36,480,000                  90,000,000                
1705 Dep Admin & HR, Pemba 1,556,052,000            2,409,853,000          
1706 Dep of Food Security and Nutrition, Pemba 18,240,000                  42,000,000                
1707 Dep of Agriculture, Pemba 41,040,000                  99,000,000                
1708 Institute of Agric Research, Pemba 27,360,000                  66,000,000                
Totals 11,219,804,188         12,569,000,000         13,758,000,000        
Revenues
0301 Head Office Pemba 91,770,890                  400,000,000               300,000,000              
0401 Dep Planning, Policy and Research 2,000,000                    2,000,000                    10,000,000                
0701 Dep of Forestry and NRNR 424,282,070               310,000,000               485,000,000              
1501 Dep of Agriculture 15,916,000                  15,000,000                  15,000,000                
1701 Institute of Agric Research 18,247,300                  21,000,000                  35,000,000                
552,216,260               748,000,000               845,000,000              
Capital Expenditures 2014/15
0401 Dep Planning, Policy and Research Gov cont Foreign grants Foreign loans total
610003 Community forest Management Program 039 Norway 84,000,000                84,000,000               
610004 Irrigation program 029 Koica 400,000,000               3,858,000,000 4,258,000,000         
610005 Strenghtening clove plantation 099 SMZ 300,000,000               300,000,000            
610007 Food Security and Nutrition Prog 004 World bank 160,000,000               64,800,000                224,800,000            
610008 Estab Agro processing Training Centre 099 SMZ 100,000,000               100,000,000            
610014 Agri Sector Dev Program ASDP 084 IFAD/AGRA/  AfDB 30,000,000                  346,886,000     376,886,000            
610016 Agr and Nat Resources Research 099 SMZ 300,000,000               300,000,000            
610017 Marketing Infra Structure, Value Addition 084 IFAD/AGRA/AfDB 60,000,000                  3,008,416,000 3,068,416,000         
610020 KATI Infrastructure 100,000,000               178,400,000              278,400,000            
610021 Glofal agri and Food Security Project (GAFSP)006 USAID 50,000,000                  570,500,000              620,500,000            
1,500,000,000            897,700,000              7,213,302,000 9,611,002,000         
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Annex A-4. Details of the budget for one department (Department of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture)  
 
  
1501 Department of Agriculture recurrent budget
Tsh
211100 Wages and salaries in cash
211101 Civil Servants 2,090,050,000         
211104 Leave travel 10,000,000               
211107 Overtime 3,000,000                 
211116 Special Allowances 38,604,000               
211116 Sitting allowances 10,000,000               
211117 Bicycles 2,880,000                 
211200 Wages and salaries in kind
211202 uniforms 2,000,000                 
212100 Actual Social contributions 209,586,000             
220100 communication
220101 Telephone and telegram 7,800,000                 
220108 Internet service -                              
220200 Hospitality
220201 Food and refresh, seminars/  meetings 1,200,000                 
220202 Gifts/pprizes 2,500,000                 
220300 Travelling expenses
Domestic 4,900,000                 
Foreign -                              
220400 Utilities, fuel and Lubricants
220401 Petrol 4,600,000                 
220402 diesel 23,000,000               
220404 Lubricants 30,000,000               
220407 Water bills -                              
220408 Electricity bills 6,000,000                 
220500 Office supplies and Services
220501 Stationary supplies 3,000,000                 
220504 Computer Accessoires supplies 4,500,000                 
220504 Sundr items 3,924,000                 
220508 Periodicals and Newspapers 1,800,000                 
220517 Annual planning and budgetting 1,200,000                 
220700 Renovation of Physical
220701 Minor Civil Work 3,000,000                 
220800 Maintenance of Machinery, Equipment 
220803 Maintenance fo motro vehicles 7,000,000                 
220805 Tractor services 50,000,000               
221000 Agric Supplies and Services -                              
221100 Capacity building -                              
263100 Transfers to other Gov Services
263167 Regional Agric Services 2,228,400,000         
263170 Plant protection division 50,000,000               
282100 Miscellaneous expenses
282100 Burial expenses 1,000,000                 
311200 Acquisition of machinery
311203 Purchase motorcycles -                              
311207 Purchase of computers 2,500,000                 
Total Dep of Agric 4,802,444,000         
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Annex B: Macro / CATSIM Assessment51 
A. Overview 
Generally regarded as the ‘insurer of last resort,’ national governments assume primary responsibility in providing 
response, recovery and reconstruction resources in times of disasters (Mechler, 2004).  Governments play an 
important role in the post-disaster period, conducting timely and accurate damage assessments, devising 
rehabilitation plans, and financing and executing rehabilitation projects. Reconstruction is often very costly. 
Appropriate assessment of existing risk and contingency liability, and reducing risk and preparing for fiscal 
contingency as much as feasible before events occur is therefore of paramount importance for government’s 
strategic decision-making, planning and resource allocation.  
To respond to such needs in 2006 the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) invented the 
“CATSIM” (Catastrophe Simulation), an interactive simulation tool to build capacity of policy makers to estimate 
and reduce public sector financial vulnerability. The model has been applied to Madagascar in 2011 and to 
several other countries. 
The CATSIM model consists of five-steps (See Table 25): In the first step, direct risk assessment is performed 
integrating information regarding the probability of natural hazard occurrence, the level of exposure and physical 
vulnerability (see Hochrainer-Stigler, 2012 for details). Direct risk is expressed in terms of economic value of 
asset at risk and return periods of natural hazards. In this initiative, we utilized the data collected in Components 
2 to the maximum degree. 
In the second step, public finance preparedness and vulnerability are determined by the national government’s 
current ability to raise internal and external funds for disaster response and reconstruction ex-ante or ex-post. 
The government’s ability to raise necessary fiscal means are typically constrained by a number of economic and 
institutional factors such as the country’s current level of public deficit and cumulative debt, capacity to raise tax 
revenue and its ability to borrow from domestic and international credit markets. 
In the third step, the government’s current level of public finance preparedness is evaluated against the disaster 
risk. The model quantifies the notion of fiscal ‘resource gap year’—i.e. the return period at which the national 
government’s current level of fiscal preparedness will be insufficient against the risk it faces.  
The potential occurrence of a fiscal resource gap and its longer-term growth implications are appraised through 
macroeconomic modelling in step four. Using the Monte-Carlo simulation approach, the model quantifies 
probabilistic macroeconomic growth trajectories based on the existing degrees of natural disaster risk and public 
finance preparedness. 
Finally, a range of risk management options is evaluated against the costs and benefits in the fifth and final step. 
Governments may adopt a number of ex-ante and ex-post measures to prepare for the disaster risk, including 
structural mitigation, contingency fund, catastrophe insurance, catastrophe bonds, and contingent credit 
arrangements.   
Since Zanzibar has not conducted CATSIM to date, as a first trial, this initiative has implemented only Steps 1 to 
3. 
 
 
 
                                                            
51 This chapter was drafted by Junko Mochizuki, Stefan Hochrainer, Keith Williges, and Reinhard Mechler, Risk Policy and 
Vulnerability Program, International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA).  Input was given by Zanzibar team and 
UNISDR. 
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Table 25: 5 Step CATSIM Modules 
Steps Tasks 
1. Direct Risk 
Assessment 
To estimate economic asset at risk and return periods of natural hazards. 
2. Fiscal Resilience 
Assessment 
To assess the country’s current fiscal resources availability and preparedness  
3. Fiscal and Economic 
Vulnerability 
To estimate a ‘fiscal resources gap year’ combining step 1 & 2 
4. Economic impact 
Assessment  
To estimate indirect impacts in terms of potential risks to macroeconomic growth  
5. Risk 
Management/Reduction 
Option Assessment 
To evaluate the risk management options  
Source: Author 
B. CATSIM analysis in Zanzibar 
Step 1: Direct Risk Assessment 
This study evaluates the ability of governments to manage potential fiscal and economic risk arising from 
earthquakes. Table 26 shows estimated loss at varying return periods for the risk of earthquake.  
Table 26: Estimated PML at varying return periods (in USD million)52 
Return 
period 
CAPRA estimate 
(implemented in this 
initiative) 
5 0.05 
10 0.10 
20 0.18 
50 0.41 
100 0.91 
500 11.40 
1000 30.22 
AAL 0.18 
 
The government is generally not responsible to provide all reconstruction needs because private households and 
businesses will assume responsibility of their own reconstruction needs. We assume that the governments 
assume the following responsibility in case of a disaster: 
• The Zanzibar government will be responsible to finance reconstruction of public assets, including roads, 
bridges, schools and hospitals, etc. (Explicit liability). 
• The Zanzibar government will extend partial support for private relief and recovery including provision of 
support to the poor (Implicit liability). 
• Total contingent liabilities of Zanzibar Government were estimated as outlined in Table 27. 
                                                            
52 The data collected from Component 2 were later revised to reflect new GAR 15 methodology. Chapter 2 was revised to 
update the data, but given short time frame, we could note reiterate the CATSIM assessment based on new data. The 
inconsistency with Chapter 2 stems from this issue. 
 89 
Table 27: Estimated Government Contingent Liability 
Item 
Value (in USD 
billion) 
References 
Total Capital Stock 0.58 The total exposed asset value calculated in Component II 
Public Capital (a) 0.18 Assumed as 30% of total capital stock based on Hochrainer-Stigler (2012) 
Private Capital  0.41 Assumed as 70% of total capital stock based on 
Hochrainer-Stigler (2012) 
Relief Spending (b) 0.12 Assumed as 20% of total capital stock based on 
Hochrainer-Stigler (2012) 
Governments Total 
Liability (a+b) 
0.29 N/A 
Source: Author 
Step 2: Fiscal Resilience Assessment  
The options to finance reconstruction and recovery may be divided into: i) ex-ante and ii) ex-post resources 
depending on whether arrangements are made prior to or after a disaster event. The below are some of the ways 
in which governments typically raise fund to finance reconstruction: 
Ex-Ante Resources 
• Preparing contingency budget line 
• Establishing reserve fund 
• Arranging contingent credit 
• Obtaining insurance for public infrastructure 
• Issuing catastrophe bonds 
 
Ex-Post Resources 
• Diverting funds from other budget expenditures 
• Raising additional tax 
• Obtaining credits from central bank 
• Borrowing and issuing domestic bonds 
• Receiving international assistance 
• Borrowing from multilateral finance institutions 
• Borrowing and issuing bonds in international market  
 
In this study, we have estimated fiscal resources availability based on available economic and fiscal statistics. 
Table 28 provides an overview of the estimated availability of ex-post resources such as international assistance, 
budget diversion, domestic bonds and credit, and international / multilateral financial institution (MFI) bonds.  
We did not consider the tax option because this is largely considered as infeasible or undesirable option by 
Zanzibar. We also did not consider ex-ante options because of data availability issues.  
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Table 28: Estimated Ex-post Fiscal Resources Availability 
Sources Assumptions Value 
International Donor 
Assistance 
10.4% of public liability 
based on international 
average53 
10.4% of 
liability 
Diversion from budget 5%>deficit, then 0 
5%<deficit, 
then 5% of total 
revenue 
USD 5.6 
million* 
Domestic Bonds and Credit 1% of gross domestic 
credit from private bank 
USD 2.46 
million** 
MFI/ International bond 
market borrowing 
SDR allocation USD 77 
million*** 
Total excluding 
international assistance 
 USD 85 
million 
Note: * based on the ‘miscellaneous expenses’ in the budget item; **assumed as limited to 4.5% of Tanzania’s domestic bonds 
and credit as estimated in Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2014); *** assumed as 4.5% of Tanzania’s new external borrowing reported 
in 2013/2014. 
Assumptions for fiscal resource availability 
International assistance 
International assistance, the amount of money made available to a country post-event in the form of donations 
from other countries and aid organizations, is assumed to be 10.4% of damages, based on regression analysis of 
historic data from Freeman et al (2002).  
Diversion from budget 
Budget diversion, representing the amount of funding from the central government’s budget which can be re-
directed and focused towards recovery, is assumed to be only possible if a government has a budget surplus or 
small deficit. For this analysis, we assume that countries with a 5% or larger budget deficit relative to GDP are 
unable to divert funding; as Zanzibar does not fit this criteria, available funds for diversion are calculated as 5% of 
the government’s total revenues. Data for this calculation are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
Domestic bonds and credit 
After an event, a nation has the possibility of trying to finance recovery via domestic credit, either by printing 
money, issuing bonds, or borrowing from domestic sources. A pitfall to this avenue of funding is the risk of 
increasing the total stock of domestic credit, which could crowd out private sector credit and lead to more 
monetary expansion and increasing inflation (World Bank, 2011). For this reason, we assume that a government 
will be limited in this regard to a maximum of 1% of gross domestic credit from private banks, the data being 
sourced from World Bank Development Indicators. There is high uncertainty whether the domestic credit market 
can be accessed and these estimates deserve further verification. 
Multi-lateral financial institution (MFI) / International bond market borrowing 
                                                            
53 This value depends on the size of disaster. Therefore, we do not have any single value. In CATSIM, the availability for each 
scenario is calculated using this percentage. 
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A further option for financing reconstruction and recovery comes from borrowing on international markets and 
from multi-lateral financing institutions. The International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which 
represent an international reserve asset, is used as a baseline estimate for how much international funding could 
be available post-event. SDRs are based on four currencies (the euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and U.S. 
dollar), and can be exchanged for usable currencies (IMF, 2014).  
Step 3: Estimating potential “fiscal resources gap”  
Combining direct risk and fiscal resources availability information obtained in previous steps, this section 
estimates the governments’ potential fiscal resources gap year — the return period at which the government will 
face difficulty in raising sufficient funds for reconstruction (Figure 39). Given the considerable uncertainty 
regarding risk estimates, the result should be interpreted with caution and further studies are certainly advisable 
to validate assumptions in Steps 1 and 2. 
While the concept of ‘fiscal resources gap’ illustrates the snapshot estimate of the country’s resource availability, 
it is important to note that a large proportion of resources that will be used to meet this one-time disaster event is 
loan-based, suggesting that there will be a longer-term cost of repayment of these loans. While the precise fiscal 
and macroeconomic implications of such longer-term impacts must be analysed in a dynamic CATSIM 
framework, it is important to keep in mind that there are a number of costs associated with each option. In 
particular, the opportunity cost of diverting resources away from other development projects must be weighed 
carefully with the benefit of resources spent on disaster reconstruction and recovery.  
Figure 39: Display of results of fiscal resources gap year 
 
Source: Author  
Based on the information gathered, it is estimated that Zanzibar has sufficient fiscal resources to cope with its 
earthquake risk even in the case of catastrophic event (500+ year event) (Figure 40). In other words, no fiscal 
gap for earthquake risk was identified. The Figure 40 compared estimated losses at different return periods with 
Zanzibar’s available fiscal resources. While Zanzibar has up to USD 85 million available to cope with disasters 
excluding international assistance, earthquake risk is relatively low with 500 and 1000-year events expected to 
result in USD 11.4 million and USD 30.2 million in damage respectively. 
 
INPUT:                   
Financing sources 
INPUT:                           
Risk Information 
OUTPUT: Fiscal 
resources Gap Year 
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From the point of view of risk spreading, it is also evident that Zanzibar’s earthquake risk is low compared to its 
ability to respond. The following back-of-the envelope calculation illustrates this point: In case of a 500-year 
earthquake, the expected damage is estimated to be USD 11.4 million. While the total population of Zanzibar 1.3 
million, this translates to approximately USD 17.5 in damage per labour force (assuming that the working 
population is 50% of total population).  Given the per-capita Gross National Income (GNI) of USD 667 reported in 
Zanzibar, USD 17.5 in damage is equivalent of 2.6 % of per capita GNI, which is small and appears to be 
manageable.   
Figure 40: Fiscal resources gap for Zanzibar: No fiscal gap observed. 
 
Source: Author 
Conclusion: Toward risk layered approach  
The government is encouraged to take a ‘risk layered management’ approach where resources are allocated 
based on the varying levels of risk facing the country, with a priority given to reducing existing risk and preventing 
the creation of new risks in the extensive risk layer (Figure 41).  The CATSIM analysis conducted from Steps 1 to 
3 has illustrated the need for improved management of disaster risk in Zanzibar. 
Figure 41: Risk layering approach  
 
Source: Author 
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Further challenge: Data gaps and way forward 
The present study identified data gaps and sources of uncertainty regarding fiscal risk assessment. The present 
studies did not fully account for indirect effects of disaster damage, and further studies are needed to quantify 
and evaluate the indirect risks caused by disaster damage. 
For Zanzibar, there is no fiscal gap at the moment due to earthquake risk. It is important to note however that this 
assessment only pertains to the earthquake risk, and other potential hazards in Zanzibar such as flood are not 
taken into account. There is clearly a need for further investigation of such risks, evaluating the fiscal resources 
availability to cope with the potential for other catastrophic disasters. Further studies are certainly needed to 
address risks of smaller and localized events such as floods and droughts that are currently under-reported.  
Given the relatively short period of data availability, high uncertainty can be expected of catastrophic risks with 
return periods of above 500. It is advisable, therefore, further data collection, validation and analysis performed in 
an iterative fashion to reduce the range of uncertainty.   
A technical and institutional support package is necessary to establish iterative risk management system in 
Zanzibar and other IOC countries (Table 34). In terms of technical needs, knowledge regarding probabilistic risk 
assessment and economic assessment tools (CATSIM) would be needed along with general awareness of risk 
related concepts and statistics. Given the limited availability of risk experts in IOC countries, a regional approach 
to training and capacity building (e.g. regional workshop for training of trainers/ regional sharing of risk knowledge 
experts, etc.) may be an effective way to leverage local capacity and resources. Institutional support for iterative 
management should be embedded in the existing DRR/CCA policy framework of Zanzibar.  
It is important to discuss and update fiscal resilience parameter and value at critical time, for example, when 
administration changes or after disaster. Financing mechanism for disaster management (see Table 16 in 
Chapter 5) should be checked regularly. Defining government liability more concretely is also recommended. 
Some of the important policy questions to ask in Zanzibar would be: 
- What is the desirable level of fiscal preparedness in the country? What would be the policy goal in mid 
to long-term (maintain or reduce fiscal gap etc)? 
- How can you balance the need for risk reduction and risk-transfer? 
- What are the priority areas of action regarding DRR in your country? 
- What are tangible milestones and goals in the DRR priority areas in your country?    
- What further risk assessment is needed to achieve the goals of DRR priority areas in your country? 
 
Table 29: Identified data gaps, technical and institutional capacity needs 
Data needs: 
-Risk information regarding additional hazards such as flood, cyclone (rain & storm surge), 
drought will improve the scope of analysis 
-Uncertainty regarding larger return period events is high given the relatively short period of 
data availability (In Component 1, loss data was collected since 1980). Further data collection 
will improve accuracy especially for higher return period events 
Technical capacity 
needs: 
-Technical training on risk assessment and economic modeling including CAPRA and 
CATSIM training.  
-Further sensitization of risk-based thinking. General familiarity of risk based terms such as 
the annual average loss, the probable maximum loss, exceedance probability must be 
explained to decision-makers.  
Institutional capacity 
needs: 
-Coordination, where both risk and socio-economic data are jointly collected and managed by 
relevant agencies (DRM agency plus Ministry of Finance). 
-Clarity on the specification of the role of each agency in data collection and analysis to avoid 
the duplication of the efforts. 
Source: Author  
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Annex C: Micro / Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)54 
A. Overview 
 
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) is an established tool in economics. This analysis can be used for both sectorial and 
project analysis. Many countries already adopt cost benefit analysis as a requirement of large-scale public 
investment projects. Although imperfect, CBA is one of the most important tools for financial decision making 
around the world. 
There are two important general objectives in CBA. One is to improve efficiency of the project selection, because 
CBA facilitates the rational comparison of available options. The second objective is to improve accountability. In 
democratized countries, it is increasingly important that government explains why a given project is selected. This 
will also contribute to reduce corruption and in some cases, lessen inappropriate interference of politicians. In this 
regard, it is important to disclose the methodology and the original data for the analysis. 
We can apply this methodology into public investment projects that contributes to DRR. However, there is a 
unique concern to be considered. For usual projects, the benefits can be tangible and visible. For example, in the 
case of a public transportation project, we can estimate the number of passengers and total fees paid by 
passengers. On the other hand, in a DRR project, the main benefit is avoided loss. In this case, we need to 
somehow estimate the benefit relating with an event not occurring. This introduces technical difficulty in DRR cost 
benefit analysis. 
CBA can measure the impact of policy on DRR at sectorial or project level. While a budget review and CATSIM 
provide overviews of the country and help raise awareness of the effectiveness of DRR investment, CBA can 
provide more detailed insight for decision-making.  
Depending on precise objectives and the resolution of available data, different levels of CBA are possible (Table 
30). If the objective is an informational study to provide overview over costs and benefits, resource requirements 
(e.g. data, time and human capacity) are relatively not so demanding. However, if the objective is project 
appraisal, the resource requirements can be enormous in terms of financial and time aspects. 
Table 30: Cost benefit analysis at different scopes 
Product Objectives Resource requirements 
Informational study Provide a broad overview over costs and benefits 
+ 
Pre-project appraisal Singling out most effective measures 
++ 
Project appraisal Detailed evaluation of project +++ 
Ex-post evaluation Evaluation of project after completion 
++ 
Source: Mechler (2008) 
CBA is based on the following simple principle: If the benefit-to-cost (B/C) ratio (benefit divided by cost) is 
greater than one, invest. Comparing multiple projects, the higher the B/C ratio, the more preferable the project. 
Also, where the net present value (NPV) (benefit minus cost) is positive, invest. The larger the NPV, the more 
preferable the project. 
                                                            
54  Sections A and B of this chapter were drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR). The Section C was drafted by Callahan Egan, 
Junko Mochizuki, Stefan Hochrainer and Reinhard Mechler, Risk Policy and Vulnerability Program, International Institute for 
Applied System Analysis (IIASA). 
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However, there are complex methodological problems that survive to date with no consensus of even modern 
economists (e.g. how to set the discount rate? How to assign monetary value to immeasurable, intangible 
items?). Furthermore, there are concerns regarding who conducts the CBA in order to retain objectiveness and 
accountability.  Administrative costs for implementing CBA are also a concern for government.  
When we assess from HFA Monitor the current status of CBA applications to DRR related projects, two issues 
arise. The first is that disaster risk is very often not accounted for in CBA for public investments, for example 
investment in infrastructure for transportation, education and health. The second issue is that direct risk 
preventive projects such as flood control infrastructure are often implemented without the routine grounding of a 
CBA framework.  
The strength of the CBA is its ability to compare several options. For example, in reducing flood loss, the practical 
issue that financially constrained governments often face is how to choose between competing options such as 
Early Warning Systems (EWS), evacuation planning, sea wall construction, building retrofitting etc. Or in 
countries that face several hazards, questions are whether to prioritize risk reduction for earthquakes, floods, or 
cyclones, etc. CBA is a useful tool to provide insight on such prioritization issues.  
Figure 42 summarizes examples of CBA to DRR policy implemented in several studies. We need to interpret the 
figure with caution because it is based on several studies and different contexts, however the interesting point is 
that in all of the featured projects benefit exceeds cost.  
Figure 42: Benefit to cost ratio of DRR policies 
 
Source: Wethli 2013 cited by the World Bank 
In this initiative, probabilistic CBA was applied. The most important difference between probabilistic and non-
probabilistic CBA is that the former accounts for the probabilistic benefits of risk reduction. While non-probabilistic 
CBA answers the question “what is the cost and benefit of sea wall construction if a cyclone of a 50-year return 
period occurs?” probabilistic CBA answers the question “what is the cost and benefit of sea wall construction 
given that cyclones of different sizes occur stochastically with different return periods?”. 
Probabilistic cost benefit analysis based on probabilistic risk assessment (forward looking probabilistic CBA) has 
been applied in several cases. When and where probabilistic risk assessment has not developed well, 
economists use historic disaster loss data (backward- looking probabilistic CBA) (Table 31). Now that more 
countries have risk profiles, more accurate forward-looking benefit estimation is increasingly possible.  
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Table 31: Forward-looking and backward-looking assessment 
Type of 
assessment 
Methodology Data requirements Cost and applicability 
Forward looking 
assessment 
(future risk 
based) 
Estimate risk as a function 
of hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability 
Local and asset specific data 
on hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability 
More accurate, but time 
and data intensive 
Backward 
looking 
assessment 
(past loss based) 
Use past losses as 
manifestations of past 
risk, then update to 
current risk 
Data on past events and 
information on changes in 
hazard exposure and 
vulnerability 
 
Note: At least four credible 
data points of past loss are 
required 
Rougher estimate, but 
more realistic for 
developing country 
contexts 
Source: Mechler 2005, underlined by UNISDR. 
In this initiative in the IOC region, forward-looking CBA was applied for Madagascar and Mauritius and backward-
looking CBA was applied for Seychelles, Union des Comores and Zanzibar. 
B. Methodology of CBA 
CBA generally gets through five steps (Figure 43). CBA starts with setting project alternatives (Step 1). For 
example, when constructing dykes against flood, the government must choose the strength: how resilient should 
the dyke be? When planning dam building for river management, the government might need to decide between 
investing in two small dams or one big dam. It is also sometimes needed to compare investment and non-
investment.  
Step 2 is to estimate the benefit of policy. This is the most difficult step for DRR projects that will be explained 
below. Step 3 is to calculate benefit to cost ratio or/and net present value. Once benefit is defined and estimated, 
this is very simple. Step 4 is to carry out a sensitivity analysis to consider the possible variation in results due to 
the uncertainty of input variables (e.g. inflation costs). 
Step 5 is distributional, or stakeholder analysis. CBA aims to measure the impact of a project on the society.  
Driven by strong economic assumption that the people who benefit will compensate for the loss to those who 
carry costs (Kaldor-Hicks Criterion), CBA does not consider distributional effects. However, reality is different. In 
making policy, distributional analysis is important to define stakeholders and care for those who may be 
negatively impacted. Therefore, in some cases, this complements the CBA. When those who benefit and those 
who pay for a project cost (including explicit and implicit) are self-evident, the government may be able to quantify 
the distributional impact. When it is not clear, qualitative analysis is implemented. 
Figure 43: 5 steps of CBA 
 
Source: Author 
The expected benefits from DRR investments are diverse. These might include avoided direct damage or loss to 
physical assets, avoided indirect loss (e.g. avoided business interruption), and even purely psychological benefits 
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(e.g. sense of safety). Although listing benefits in a systematic way is important, we are not necessarily able to 
estimate or calculate all of the listed benefits (Figure 44). 
Figure 44: Expected benefits from DRR investment 
 
Source: Author 
In estimating benefit, a main challenge is to assign monetary values to each expected benefit (Figure 45). If the 
benefits and costs have monetary values, the government can use them55. If the benefit is expressed by time 
(e.g. reduction of commuting time due to road infrastructure), the government needs to estimate the time gained 
and multiply it by the value of time (e.g. the average wage or minimum wage per hour).  
Environmental economists have long tackled the monetization of intangible benefits and developed many 
methods. For example, one method is directly asking people how much he/she is willing to pay if the project is 
implemented and estimating the monetary benefits from the answers to that question. 
Figure 45: Expected benefit classification 
 
Source: Author 
                                                            
55 More technically told, economists advocates using opportunity costs instead of the monetary value 
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It is important to keep it in mind that this CBA often reflects only partial benefits. In probabilistic CBA, estimation 
of avoided loss is based on probabilistic risk assessment (forward-looking CBA) or historic loss database 
(backward-looking CBA). In that sense, the scope of CBA analysis is defined by the scope of risk and loss data. 
For the case study described below, the risk assessment was limited to direct loss. Therefore, the CBA study 
also focuses only on the direct loss (written in bold in Figure 57). However, this is nonetheless a meaningful first 
step, because physical loss often needs to be recovered by reconstruction, which is very costly. 
The benefit is estimated by measuring how much annual average loss (AAL) will be reduced after the investment 
(Figure 46). In case of forward-looking CBA, the data can be input into software such as CAPRA to estimate the 
AAL before and after investment. In case of backward-looking CBA, AAL before and after investment is 
calculated by using statistical methods (Simpson rule56). 
Figure 46: Benefits in terms of reduced AAL 
 
Source: Author 
Estimating cost is relatively simple. Project cost and maintenance cost will be listed. Intangible costs (e.g. 
negative environmental impact) are sometimes also estimated. 
After having translated benefit and cost into monetary value, the discount rate will be a critical issue with a large 
impact on the result of a CBA57. Discount rates express time preferences within the society. Low discount rates 
will evaluate future benefit higher than the case applying high discount rate. For example the present value of 
USD 100 million in 100 years later is about USD 37 million in 1% discount rate, USD 2 million in 4% discount rate 
and only USD 0.1 million in 7% discount rate. The discount rate has more impact when the project sustains for a 
long time, which is often the case for big infrastructure.  
In CBA for public project, social discount rates are often defined by government (Table 32). If the government 
considers opportunity cost of capital, with more market based consideration, then discount rate tends to be 
                                                            
56 To estimate the AAL given probabilistic losses and return period data, the Simpson rule is applied.  If we know several data 
points of (return period, PML), depending on the amount of data points available, we can create probabilistic ranges between 
two data points and multiply the range by the estimated midpoint of loss in this given range. This is expressed by 
 AAL for range p1, p2= (p2-p1)*((L1+L2)/2) 
L1 and L2 represent the maximum loss associated with a given event. P1 and p2 are the probabilities associated with each 
event. By summing up the AAL for each interval, or range (p1 to p2, p2 to p3,..) we have a an estimate for the total AAL. 
57 When setting discount rate, it is important to consider the impact of expected inflation, if discount rate is 10%, but expected 
inflation rate is also 10%, the inflation rate will offset the discount rate. 
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higher. However, if the government wants to politically reflect social time preference to balance the benefit of 
current and future generation, the rate tends to be set low. The International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) 
recommends that governments adopt a low discount rate to recognize that benefits of future generations are 
equally important as those of current generation and future generation will be able to enjoy benefits from our 
actions today, in accordance with the concept of sustainable development (IPCC, 2012). It is important that 
government clarifies the rationale behind social discount rate setting; gaining accountability from the process is 
as important, or more, than the actual rate chosen. 
Table 32: Discount rates in several countries 
Country Social discount rate Rationale 
USA 
7% 
3% 
4% (water) 
Opportunity cost of capital 
Social time preference 
Social time preference 
New Zealand 7% Opportunity cost of capital 
Japan 4% Opportunity cost of capital 
EU 3.5% Social time preference 
UK 3.5% Social time preference 
France  4% Social time preference 
Source: Author based on Satoru Otani et al (n.d) 
The result of CBA is dependent on some critical variables. It is therefore always good to implement sensitivity 
analysis to observe how the result changes when we apply different values to those variables. For example, 
changing the social discount rate explained above will significantly change the result of the CBA. Construction 
periods and costs are also critical uncertain factors. Approving uncertainty and preparing several scenarios will 
strengthen the credibility of analysis instead of weakening it. 
While CBA is an explicit and rigorous accounting framework for systematic cost-efficient decision making and 
common yardstick with a money metric against which to measure projects for social improvement, there are 
some limitations. CBA often does not assess non-market values and indirect impacts, lacks accounting for the 
distribution of benefits and costs (due to Kaldor-Hicks Criterion), cannot resolve strong differences in value 
judgments, and is strongly influenced by discount rates. CBA should not be the sole criterion for evaluating 
policies and projects, but should be complemented by other, non-economic considerations. 
 
C. CASE STUDY: Zanzibar Urban Service Project 
 
I Project Proposal 
The Probabilistic Cost- Benefit Analysis (CBA) is done on one component of the Zanzibar Urban Services Project 
(ZUSP) funded by the World Bank intended to strengthen the Zanzibar Municipal Council (ZMC), infrastructure 
and development. The specific component analysed here is the construction of surface water drainage system on 
the island of Unguja. The goal of the drainage system is to reduce the damage caused by flooding in the 
Municipality and particularly within the walls of the Old Stone town. The planned outputs of the drainage 
component are to construct about 20 km of surface water drains and related works within the ZMC areas outside 
of Stonetown. Six separate surface drainage systems will be constructed with a catchment of around 1700 
hectares eliminating stagnant water ponds of over 170 hectares, which affects more than 20,000 persons living 
in, and around 3.645 houses (WB ZUSP PAD 2011). ZUSP is currently in the final stages of tendering these 
works and the actual construction is expected to start in 2015. 
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Source: ZUSP documentation  
II Approach 
We analyse the costs and benefits of the project by using probabilistic rainfall and damage distributions to assess 
the changes in expected losses. Given there is no probabilistic risk assessment of flood using hazard, exposure 
and vulnerability information, we decided to implement backward looking probabilistic CBA. We rely on past 
rainfall and damage data to create probabilistic estimations. However, constraints with available past data on 
rainfall and associated losses significantly affects the results of the analysis. Economic assessment of the project 
originally performed by the World Bank finds significantly different outcomes than our present probabilistic CBA, 
due to differences in assumptions and methodologies. Therefore, we first present the results of this probabilistic 
CBA, followed by a discussion on the factors influencing the results, including a comparison to the original non-
probabilistic CBA analysis performed by the World Bank.  In our analysis we follow the general methodology for 
conducting cost-benefit analysis laid out by Mechler (2005). 
III Probabilistic Flood Damages 
In order to estimate the annual average losses (AAL) caused by rainfall in the Old Stone Town of Zanzibar, we 
needed to gather previous flood loss information. The availability of loss data was very limited58 and resulted in 
the collection of only one data point gathered through documentations of relief and recovery efforts available 
online (IFRC 2005). This was of a 2005 flood (one of the biggest ever measured with 400 mm of rain in two 
days), in which, based on the data received, 64 houses were destroyed59 within Stonetown. Economic losses 
were then estimated based on assumptions regarding the value of the housings. This flood is described “as the 
worst in 40 years” (IFRC 2005).  
Given locally specific housing values were not readily available, we used an average housing value of Seychelles 
used in the 2013 Flood Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) adjusting for the differences in living standards 
based on per capita GDPs. We concluded that the average housing value is roughly USD 2,500 in 2011 prices. 
Therefore, the total damaged housing value was estimated to be USD 170,000 (roughly USD 2,500 times 64 
housings damaged).  
Furthermore, information was provided regarding disturbances to water and sanitation due to the 2005 flood, 
which resulted in an estimated USD 580,000 (adjusted to 2011 prices) in emergency response needs (ZAWA 
n.a.). With no other information of losses, direct or indirect, we assumed the loss from the 2005 floods to be the 
sum of the housing damage and the emergency water and sanitation response needs, cumulating to USD 
750,000 (Table 33).  It is important to note that this 2005 flood event, despite being the largest in 40 years was 
not listed in the disaster damage and loss dataset compiled in the Component 1 of this project, prompting the 
need to further analyse and validate the available damage and loss information.  
                                                            
58 The data collected in component 1 was very scarce and we decided not to use data from national disaster loss database. 
59 59 According to Gerard Hendriksen, consultant in Zanzibar, these houses would have been damaged, not destroyed. He 
suspects that the information sources may not be reliable. 
Figure 47: Flood in urban area of Zanzibar (left) and improved drainage systems (right) 
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Table 33: Estimated damage and losses due to the 2005 flood in Zanzibar 
Damage and Losses Economic Value 
(2011 USD) 
References 
Houses destroyed 170,000 IFRC 2005 
Economic values are estimated 
based on DaLA Seychelles 
PDNA (2013) 
Disturbances to water 
and sanitation 
580,000 Zawa (n.a.) 
Total  750,000 
 
 
From this data point, along with previous rainfall information source, estimations could be made about the return 
period of the 2005 event. It is important to keep in mind that risk curve estimation generally requires more than 3 
credible data points (Mechler 2005), and the use of single data point with the probability of first loss estimate60 
adopted here cannot give as accurate loss estimate as recommended. Despite this data limitation, we have 
estimated a risk curve based on the extreme value statistics to perform illustrative probabilistic CBA. We have 
pre-tested the suitability of various distribution parameters, in which the Pareto distribution is found to fit the data 
best and was used in the subsequent analysis.   
Losses caused by events of different return periods were estimated as well as the AAL caused by flooding events 
(Table 34). The expected annual loss is estimated applying the Simpson rule61. For example, based on the return 
periods identified, the expected loss up to a 5 year event is the cumulative probability of the 5 year event (0.8) 
minus the cumulative probability of the 2 year event (0.5) multiplied by the average loss between the 2 and 5 year 
events. In numerical terms: 
 EL (5-2 years)= (0.8-0.5)*((138.6+0)/2)= 20.8 
This process is then done for all other intervals. For the last interval, it is assumed for this CBA that losses 
associated with events of more than a 200-year return period will result in the same losses as the 200 year event. 
Therefore in the last interval, 0.995 to 1, the expected loss is simply (1-0.995)*1498.96, yielding the value of 7.49. 
Cumulating the losses for all events, the AAL in the Municipality of Zanzibar is roughly USD 102,000. This value 
will be used as baseline when estimating the benefit as a result of the surface water drainage system. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34: Return period and associated losses, AAL (in USD thousand) 
Return 
period 
Exceedance 
probability 
Maximum 
Loss 
expected 
annual loss 
                                                            
60 First loss estimate means probability that a disaster event (of any magnitude resulting in some loss) will occur. 
61 Please see the footnote 56 regarding Simpson rule. 
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2 0.5 0 0 
5 0.2 138.6 20.8 
10 0.1 278.6 20.9 
20 0.05 457.6 18.4 
40 0.025 700.0 14.5 
50 0.02 773.6 3.7 
100 0.01 1,091.6 9.3 
200 0.005 1499 6.5 
   7.5 
AAL   101.6 
Source: Author 
IV. Benefits 
To assess the benefits of the drainage, assumptions have to be made about the economic losses that will be 
reduced as a result of the drainage project. There is no clear data on the expected amount of loss reduction 
resulting from the drainage system. As the 2005 flood event was the most damaging in recent years, it is 
assumed that the drainage system would be designed to protect against all damages caused by events with a 
return period up to 40 years (with loss of around USD 700,000). Events with larger return period would have 
losses reduced, but not eliminated (Table 33). As the actual reduction in losses is not known, particularly for 
extreme events, we set strong assumptions. With probabilistic CBA, it is difficult to determine if, and if so, to what 
extent a project designed to reduce loss for more frequent events will reduce loss against intensive (less 
frequent, more severe) events.  
Table 35 below shows the estimated benefits as a loss reduction in individual events and the AAL as a result of 
the drainage project. As can be seen, the reduction in AAL, representing the annual benefit, is USD 85,300. 
Figure 47 displays the reduction in losses as a result of the project in graphic form. The shift in the loss return 
period curve represents the risk reduction of the region. 
Table 35: Estimated annual benefits as a reduction in AAL due to the surface drainage system (in USD 
thousand) 
Losses without drainage 
system (baseline) 
  Losses with drainage system 
Return 
period Exceedance probability 
Maximum 
Loss 
Expected               
annual loss 
Maximum 
loss 
Loss       
reduction 
(%) 
Expected 
annual loss 
2 0.5 0 0 0 100 0 
5 0.2 138 20.8 0 100 0 
10 0.1 278 20.9 0 100 0 
20 0.05 457 18.4 0 100 0 
40 0.025 700 14.5 0 100 0 
50 0.02 773 3.7 154.7 80 0.7 
100 0.01 1,091 9.3 545.8 50 4.7 
200 0.005 1,498 6.5 1124.2 25 4.9 
    7.5  20 6.0 
AAL   101.6   16.3 
 
    
Reduced 
AAL: 
Benefit 
85.3 
Source: Author 
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Figure 48: Loss Return Period Curves pre and post the Zanzibar Drainage Project 
 
Source: Author 
V Costs 
The cost of the drainage project is estimated to amount to USD 9,971,340 (ZUSP final design report, 2010). This 
includes the cost of all six of the drainage subsystems in the project. The breakdown of the costs involved in the 
project can be seen in Table 36.  
Table 36: Breakdown of drainage component costs 
Item 
No. Item Description 
Cost 
Estimate 
(USD) 
1 Preliminary and general 607,752 
2 System C 2,958,812 
3 System D 312,074 
4 System E 2381,907 
5 System F 227,229 
6 System G 835,842 
7 System 1 973,663 
8 Subtotal 1 8,297,349 
9 Contingency- 15% 1,244,602 
10 Subtotal 2 9,541,954 
11 Consultancy Fee- 4.5% 429,338 
12 Total 9,971,340 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, the revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. ZUSP Construction of Surface Water drainage 
System, Final design report, 2010 
While no data are available on the maintenance cost of the project, an estimated 0.5% of the project cost per 
year is included as a maintenance cost. This amounts to an undiscounted amount of USD 49,857 per year. The 
lifetime of the project is reported at an estimated 30 years (ZUSP final design report). 
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VI Time factors 
VI.1 Discount rate.  
There has been no official social discount rate in Zanzibar. Therefore, we start with an initial assumption of 5% 
(International Monetary Fund, 2013) but apply different rates in the sensitivity analysis. 
VI.2 Increase in Exposed Assets 
As the drainage project is intended to protect against flooding for a period of 30 years, it is assumed that the 
amount of exposed assets in the Municipality of Zanzibar will increase in a yearly basis. This is supported by the 
4.5% annual increase in population (Ministry of Finance and Urban Affairs, Zanzibar, September 2010), 
suggesting that flood events will affect a greater number of people. For a baseline level, an increase of 1.5% of 
exposed assets per year will be applied to the analysis (Mechler, 2005). This will be represented as an annual 
increase of 1.5% to the annual benefits.  
VII Results 
Using the data, provided information, and assumptions described to this point, we are able to conduct a 
probabilistic cost-benefit analysis for the project. Table 37 below shows the net present value of the project with a 
30-year lifespan, a 5% discount rate, and an annual increase in exposed assets of 1.5%. In this scenario, despite 
the reduction in losses of over USD 100,000 annually, the project is shown to be highly cost-ineffective, with a 
Net Present Value (NPV) of USD -9.2 million. Table 38 and Table 39 below show sensitivity analysis with regards 
to the discount rate and the increase in exposed assets. 
Table 37: CBA of drainage project with a 30-year lifespan, 5% discount rate, a 1.5% annual increase in 
exposed assets (amounts in USD) 
Calen
dar 
year 
Proje
ct 
year 
Benefit
s    
(1.5% 
annual 
exposur
e 
increas
e) 
Costs Net 
benefits 
(benefit
s – 
costs) 
Discounted 
costs (5%) 
Discount
ed 
benefits 
(5%) 
Discount
ed net 
benefits 
(5%) 
2011 1 0 9,971,3
40 
-
9,971,34
0 
9,971,340 0 -
9,971,340 
2012 2 86,580 49,857 36,723 47,364 82,251 34,887 
2013 3 87,878 49,857 38,021 44,996 79,310 34,314 
2014 4 89,196 49,857 39,340 42,746 76,475 33,729 
2015 5 90,534 49,857 40,678 40,609 73,741 33,132 
2016 6 91,892 49,857 42,036 38,578 71,105 32,526 
2017 7 93,271 49,857 43,414 36,649 68,563 31,913 
2018 8 94,670 49,857 44,813 34,817 66,111 31,295 
2019 9 96,090 49,857 46,233 33,076 63,748 30,672 
2020 10 97,531 49,857 47,674 31,422 61,469 30,047 
2021 11 98,994 49,857 49,137 29,851 59,271 29,420 
2022 12 100,479 49,857 50,622 28,358 57,152 28,794 
2023 13 101,986 49,857 52,130 26,941 55,109 28,169 
2024 14 103,516 49,857 53,659 25,594 53,139 27,546 
2025 15 105,069 49,857 55,212 24,314 51,239 26,926 
2026 16 106,645 49,857 56,788 23,098 49,408 26,309 
2027 17 108,244 49,857 58,388 21,943 47,641 25,698 
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2028 18 109,868 49,857 60,011 20,846 45,938 25,092 
2029 19 111,516 49,857 61,659 19,804 44,296 24,492 
2030 20 113,189 49,857 63,332 18,814 42,712 23,899 
2031 21 114,887 49,857 65,030 17,873 41,185 23,312 
2032 22 116,610 49,857 66,753 16,979 39,713 22,734 
2033 23 118,359 49,857 68,502 16,130 38,293 22,163 
2034 24 120,135 49,857 70,278 15,324 36,924 21,600 
2035 25 121,937 49,857 72,080 14,558 35,604 21,047 
2036 26 123,766 49,857 73,909 13,830 34,331 20,502 
2037 27 125,622 49,857 75,765 13,138 33,104 19,966 
2038 28 127,506 49,857 77,650 12,481 31,920 19,439 
2039 29 129,419 49,857 79,562 11,857 30,779 18,922 
2040 30 131,360 49,857 81,504 11,264 29,679 18,415 
2041 31 133,331 49,857 83,474 10,701 28,618 17,917 
total  3,250,0
80 
11,467,
041 
-
8,216,96
1 
10,715,295 1,528,83
0 
-
9,186,46
5 
 
Table 38: Sensitivity analysis with regards to the discount rate (at 1.5% increase in exposed assets) 
Discount rate 0% 2% 5% 7% 10% 15% 
NPV -8,216,961 -8,722,552 -9,186,465 -9,376,635 -9,559,891 -9,721,907 
B/C 0.28 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.05 
 
Table 39: Sensitivity analysis with regards to rate of increase in exposed assets (at 5% discount rate) 
Asset exposure 
increase 0% 1.5% 3% 5% 10% 
NPV -9,442,460 -9,186,465 -8,855,689 -8,253,101 -5,277,216 
B/C 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.51 
 
VIII Limitation of the analysis 
Based on limited data, the surface drainage project seems inefficient use of funds, given the negative NPV and 
B/C ratios less than one, regardless of the discount rate or increase in exposed assets.  
For estimating the AAL for Zanzibar, data only offered was one previous event, a 2005 flood. Given this event 
and probability of first loss, a probable maximum loss curve was created.  
Information revealed inconsistencies in the damages caused by the 2005 flood. In the data received and 
analysed in this report, there were only 64 houses destroyed (IFRC 2005). Yet another source claim that “20,000 
people” were affected in the 2005 flood event and still other source claims that 3,645 housings are affected 
annually by flooding (questions for expert opinions, 2011). However, with no concrete data other than the 64 
housings destroyed and the water sanitation recovery costs, it is difficult to obtain a rather accurate amount of 
economic losses caused by the 2005 flooding in the region where the drainage system will be implemented.  
In addition, the present assessment did not take into account many of the indirect and intangible losses that may 
result due to natural disasters, such as business losses due to floods, additional medical cost associated with 
morbidity and any reduction in land values that may result due to frequent inundation. These are clear limitations 
of this current analysis and further studies are certainly needed to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness 
of our analysis. 
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IX Comparison with the World Bank analysis 
To put our analysis in perspective, the World Bank has also done economic analysis on the drainage project with 
significantly different results. While the specific number included in their CBA are not known, comparing the 
assumptions between the two studies can help understand the difference in outcomes, as well as the importance 
of robust and consistent data. The following outlines the basic assumptions within the World Bank’s project 
appraisal document for the ZUSP project in the section on economic analysis of the drainage system component 
(World Bank Report No: 57162-TZ, 2011) 
• 3,645 households directly affected by stagnant water ponds and flooding 
• Cost of dealing with flooding will increase 10% annually (10% increase in exposed assets) 
• Cost of flood prevention and renovation is 5 USD per square meter, with the average housing size 
of 150 sq meters (750 USD per housing). 
• Drainage system will increase household saving and housing value will increase (no specified 
amount). 
• Discount rate is 7%. 
 
There is no information regarding the lifetime of the project in their analysis (we assume as 30 years in this 
report). What the World Bank concludes is that “under these assumptions, it is estimated that about USD 4.429 
million will be incurred by the household directly affected by floods in 2010”. While not specified explicitly, it 
appears they estimate that annual losses incurred by households at USD 4.429 million. Using the data provided 
to us, we estimated an AAL to be slightly over USD 101,000. As a result of this very large discrepancy, the World 
bank finds a NPV of the project to be over USD 20 million, compared to this report’s estimate of USD -9 million.  
It is not the intention of this report to argue the accuracy of this report over another. Rather, what these 
discrepancies can show is the importance of the input information when conducting cost benefit analysis. As a 
number of reports claim 20,000 people affected by the floods in 2005, it seems unlikely that the data showing all 
losses as the 64 destroyed housings covers the true losses caused by the flood. However, lack of any further 
detailed information on the economic losses as a result of the flood limits the robustness of any attempt at 
accurately estimating the probabilistic losses caused by flooding or any other event. Without a robust assessment 
of the losses caused by past hazardous events, estimations of the benefits of disaster risk reduction investment 
will also be inaccurate. 
VIII Conclusions 
The results of this CBA on the surface drainage system in Municipality of Zanzibar highlights challenges 
regarding limited data and differences in reported losses and affected households and individuals. The lack of 
documentation regarding past disaster damage and losses seems to lead to underestimation of probabilistic 
benefit associated with drainage improvement project. The extremely large difference in results between this 
study and that of the World Bank results from difference in approaches and basic assumptions, highlighting the 
need for robust and complete loss and risk data when assessing the economic viability of a disaster risk 
reduction project. 
Additional information regarding past damage and losses could also significantly change the results of present 
analysis. For a backward looking CBA as was done here, the data on previous disaster losses in combination 
with data on the severity of the weather events is critical to making accurate estimates for the AAL. Some of the 
previous loss data were rather limited, which suggests that potentially there was more unreported damage. This 
further emphasizes the importance of complete and accurate loss data when conducting backward looking CBA.  
It is also important to keep in mind that the present assessment did not take into account many of the indirect and 
intangible losses, such as loss due to business interruption and any reduction in land values that may result due 
to frequent disasters. These are clear limitations of this current analysis and further studies are certainly needed 
to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of our analysis. 
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Annex D: Workshops and Meetings in IOC region  
 
Inception meeting 
 
Dates: 15-17 April 2013 
Venue: ICCS, Seychelles 
Host:  Ministry of Environment 
UNISDR staff in charge: Julio Serje, Kazuko Ishigaki, Manuela Di Mauro 
Participants: 34 
 
Component 1: capacity building for national disaster loss database 
Comoros national workshop:  
Dates: June 11-13, 2013 
Venue: Hotel Retaj 
Host: the Civil Protection and the Ministry of Environment.  
UNISDR staff in charge: Sylvain Ponserre and Julio Serje 
Participants:  25 
 
Seychelles national workshop:   
Dates: 14 - 19 Jul 2013.   
Venue: Seychelles Fishing Authority, Division of Risk and Disaster Management (DRDM) 
Host: the Division of Risk and Disaster Management (DRDM)  
UNISDR staff in charge:  Sylvain Ponserre 
Participants: 22 
 
Madagascar national workshop:  
Dates: 28 Jul - 01 Aug 2013.   
Venue: Hotel Colbert 
Host: The "Cellule de Prévention et Gestion des Urgences"(CPGU) 
UNISDR staff in charge: Sylvain Ponserre 
Participants: 36 
 
Mauritius national workshop:  
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Dates: 24 - 29 Aug 2013.   
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters 
Host: Ministry of Environment 
UNISDR staff in charge:  Sylvain Ponserre 
Participants: 40 
 
Zanzibar national workshop:  
Dates: 11-14 June 2013 
Venue: Zanzibar Ocean View Hotel 
Host: NBI Office  
UNISDR staff in charge:  XXXXX 
Participants: 37 
 
Component2: Capacity building for Probabilistic Risk Assessment: 
 
First regional workshop 
Dates: 21-23 October 2013 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters, Mauritius 
Host: Ministry of Environment  
UNISDR staff in charge: Manuela Di Mauro, Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 40 
 
Second regional workshop 
Dates: 20-22 November 2013 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters, Mauritius 
Host: Ministry of Finance 
UNISDR staff in charge: Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 22 
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Third regional workshop 
Dates: 19-21 March 2014 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters, Mauritius 
Host:  
UNISDR staff in charge: Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 31 
 
Mauritius national workshop:  
Dates: 17-18 February 2014 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission Secretariat 
Host:  
UNISDR staff in charge: Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 10 
 
Seychelles national workshop:  
Dates: 23-27 June 2014 
Venue:   
Host: The Division of Risk and Disaster Management (DRDM) 
UNISDR staff in charge: Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 
 
Component 3: economic analysis and public investment planning 
 
First regional workshop 
Dates: 24-26 June, 2014 
Venue: ICCS, Seychelles 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Lezlie Moriniere (consultant) 
Host: Ministry of finance 
Participants: 15 
 
Second regional workshop 
Dates: 20-22, October, 2014 
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Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters, Mauritius 
Host: Ministry of Finance 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Lezlie Moriniere (consultant) 
Participants: 19 
 
Zanzibar national workshop:  
Dates: 10 December, 2014 
Venue: Zanzibar Ocean View Hotel 
Host: Department of Environment 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Lezlie Morinière (consultant) 
Participants: 30 
Seychelles national workshop:  
 
Dates: 02-03 Feb 2015 
Venue: Conference Center 
Host: Ministry of Finance 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Julio Serje, Lezlie Moriniere (consultant) 
Participants: 30 
Comoros national workshop:   
Dates: 05-06 Feb 2015 
Venue: Direction générale de la Sécurité Civile 
Host: Direction générale de la sécurité civile 
UNISDR staff in charge: Julio Serje, Lezlie Morinière (consultant) 
Participants:55 
 
Madagascar national workshop:  
Dates: 28-30 Feb 2015 
Venue: STC 
Host: Ministry of Finance 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Lezlie Morinière (consultant) 
Participants: 30 
 
Mauritius national workshop:  
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Dates: tbc 
Venue: tbc 
Host: tbc  
UNISDR staff in charge: tbc 
Participants: tbc 
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UNISDR Working Papers on 
Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
 
 
1. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Mauritius, February 2015 
 
2. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Madagascar, February 2015 
 
3. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Seychelles, February 2015 
  
4. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Union des Comores, February 2015 
 
5. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Zanzibar, February 2015 
 
6. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of South-West Indian Ocean Region, February 2015 
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The series offers analysis and policy guidance to national governments and other 
stakeholders to strengthen public investment planning and financing strategy to reduce and 
manage disaster risk. These reviews are part of a larger body of UNISDR work on disaster risk 
reduction, including loss database building, global probabilistic risk assessment, HFA Monitor 
and others. This work includes both theoretical reports and reports on specific countries or 
regions. 
 
 
Contents: 
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Chapter 1: Country Structure 
Chapter 2: Disaster Loss 
Chapter 3: Disaster Risk 
Chapter 4: National DRM/DRR/CCA Framework 
Chapter 5: DRR/DRM/CCA in Public Investment Planning 
Chapter 6: Policy Recommendations 
Annex A: Risk-Sensitive Budget Review 
Annex B: Macro/CATSIM Assessment 
Annex C: Micro/Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Annex D: Workshops and Meetings in IOC Region 
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